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BEWARE OF RISK EVERYWHERE:
AN IMPORTANT LESSON FROM
THE CURRENT CREDIT CRISIS
Michael C. Macchiarola*
"I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness."
- Allen Ginsburg in "Howl"
I. INTRODUCTION
As the credit crisis continues to spiral through the world's economies,
there has been no shortage of pundits and commentators offering their spin
on the problems and proposing solutions. While the entire episode will
take some time to sort itself out, its effects are being felt widely and some
lessons about its cause can already be gleaned. As a result of this increased
attention, a real "teaching moment" has begun to take shape for law school
professors training future lawyers in course material dealing with financial
issues.' This Article attempts to highlight a lesson that should be
incorporated into the curricula following recent market events.
The purpose of this Article is to remind attorneys, future attorneys,
* Adjunct Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. A.B., 1994, College of the Holy
Cross; J.D. 1997, New York University School of Law; M.B.A., 2001, Columbia Business School. Mr.
Macchiarola is a member of the adjunct faculty at St. Francis College in Brooklyn, New York. He
currently practices law in New York City. This Article is a private publication of the author, expresses
only his views and does not necessarily represent the views of his firm or any client of his firm. The
author would like to thank Gurpreet Bal, David Uibelhoer, and Cassandra Christiansen for their
assistance with this article and all of the teachers that have given their time and energy to teach me
important lessons, including Frank and Mary Macchiarola, Steve Bogart, Anthony J. Genovesi, Col. L.
F. Sullivan, Robert Sabatelli, Terri Bianchi, Vincent Lapomarda, S.J., Bill Bratton, John T. O'Connor,
Bob Reder, and Brian Levine.
1. Any lawyer or aspiring lawyer requiring additional evidence that this current crisis should be
taken seriously need only look as far as the recent layoffs in the legal profession. See, e.g., Nate
Raymond, Job Losses in Legal Sector Continue, AMLAW DAILY, Apr. 3, 2009, http://amlawdaily.
typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/job-losses-in-legal-sector-continue.html (observing that "[s]ince the
recession began in December 2007, the legal services sector has lost an estimate 24,900 jobs" in the
United States). Job preservation can have an incredible motivational effect.
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law professors, investors, and anyone else that will listen to beware of risk
everywhere-especially where you don't see it. This Article does not mean
to suggest that this lesson is by any means the only takeaway from recent
market events.2 Nor does it necessarily represent the most important
principle to be learned from this crisis. Instead, this Article is meant to
stimulate discussion around a series of issues which, despite their growing
importance in both the professional and personal lives of lawyers, still see
far too little emphasis on law school campuses. Moreover, it is hoped that
this Article will serve in some small way to make these issues more
accessible and less threatening to law students and faculty alike. The credit
crisis and its lingering effects are not going away anytime soon. As a
result, law schools should seriously consider expanding the traditional
opportunities available to students to study the policies and products of the
capital markets. Moreover, with the regulatory landscape likely to change
significantly in the coming years, newly minted attorneys-free from much
of the history and preconceived thinking about markets and products and
how they should function-will bring a much needed perspective to the
market. Understanding this Article's lesson will serve any young attorney
well in navigating the increasingly difficult waters of a legal practice in the
coming years.
The Article will begin with a short review of the events that have
brought our current extraordinary period of financial turbulence. This
section briefly discusses some of the products, policies and conditions that
were in place and encouraged during the period that preceded the recent
contraction. Rather than pass qualitative judgment, this section of the
Article is meant only to provide context and to set the stage for the lesson's
presentation.
Law students in my Corporate Finance course often ask why it is so
important that they endure such a heavy dose of financial theory. The
following vignette, recently recounted to me by a colleague, is instructive
in answering the question:
There was a law student presenting a case in a first-year Contracts
class. The student did a fine job stating the holding, rehashing the facts
of the case and describing the court's reasoning. When the professor
pressed the student for further detail on the mechanics of a damage
calculation, the student replied that the question was a "business issue"
and added "I'm just the lawyer." "And a pretty shitty one you'll
make," responded the professor.3
2. There is a tension here. A good history student knows that it is probably best to write history
after everyone is dead. A good business student, by contrast, knows that if you are not leaming from
yesterday, you are at a disadvantage today.
3. This teaching moment is attributed to Professor Frank J. Macchiarola, the father of the author,
during his time as the Dean of Cardozo Law School. While the lesson is certainly recognizable, the
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The moral-in colorful language-is that lawyers must understand
their client's business intimately. While the process of learning can be
mind-numbing at times, such an understanding is essential to zealous
advocacy. As the disclaimer on my Corporate Finance syllabus warns,
"this stuff does not necessarily go down easy." As a result, law students
wishing to become effective advocates for their clients must embrace the
notion that practicing law well in this area requires a constant vigilance and
an untiring desire to learn, understand and process information. In practice,
it is abundantly clear that the finest lawyers work hard to understand the
financial theories that underpin today's products and markets. Hopefully
the lesson of this Article will serve as a guidepost as new legal
professionals begin their own journey toward steering their clients through
the complex issues that will fall out from this crisis in the coming years.
II. OH, WHAT A TANGLED WEB WE'VE WEAVED
"When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the
activities of a casino, the job (of capitalism) is likely to be ill-done."
- John Maynard Keynes
At the turn of the twenty-first century, three important developments
provided the perfect environment for a dramatic expansion of credit in the
United States. First, an extraordinarily tranquil period of macroeconomic
conditions coupled with a global savings glut5 resulted in historically low
long-term interest rates and benign volatility.6 Second, the innovation and
colorful language is most likely inflated.
4. See, e.g. George Melloan, We're All Keynesians Again, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2009 at A17
(observing that between 2002 and 2007, the funds raised in the United States credit markets nearly
doubled).
5. See Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia
Association of Economics: The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, (Mar. 10,
2005) (observing "a remarkable reversal in the flows of credit to developing and emerging-market
economies, a shift that has transformed those economies from borrowers on international capital
markets to large net lenders."). See also, Andy Mukhejee, Liquidity Glut Stunts Growth. Asia's Excess
Savings Keep the Region's Debt Markets Shallow, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 9, 2007 ("a liquidity glut is
militating against Asia's capacity to generate an adequate supply of financial assets that will allow it to
keep its savings at home.").
6. Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A Discussion of the Background, Market
Reactions, and Policy Responses, 90 FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REV. 531, 533 (2008). See also
Timothy Geithner, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2007 Financial Markets
Conference - Credit Derivatives, Sea Island, Georgia: Liquidity Risk an the Global Economy (May 15,
2007) (observing that "[flinancial markets over the past several years have been characterized by an
unusual constellation of low forward interest rates, ample liquidity, low risk premia and low
expectations of future volatility."); Thierry Bracke & Michael Fidora, Global Liquidity Glut or Global
Savings Glut? A Structural VAR Approach (Eur. Cent. Bank Working Paper No. 911, 2008).
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expansion of securitization7 "produced sophisticated financial assets with
relatively high yields and good credit ratings." 8 Third, with both major
political parties "intoxicated with the idea of 'affordable' housing," 9
mortgage underwriting standards "had been undermined by virtually every
branch of government since the early 1990s."'
During the first half of this decade, these low interest rates, large
inflows of foreign capital, and increasingly lax mortgage lending standards
combined to dramatically inflate the price of houses in the United States. 1
As home prices increased, mortgage lenders saw very little risk in
extending credit because the underlying housing collateral continued to
increase rapidly in value.' 2  The rise in home ownership also served to
increase the price of housing in the United States-helping to fuel a
housing bubble.13  The bubble, in turn, attracted a large number of
7. Securitization is the process of repackaging otherwise illiquid individual loans and converting
them into (more liquid) marketable securities. Many have laid a great deal of the blame for the current
credit crisis squarely at the feet of securitization techniques. For a rather thorough examination of the
process of securitization and a critique of its "dubious legal foundations," see Kenneth Kettering,
Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOzO L.
REV. 1553 (2008). See, e.g. Anastasia Nesvetailova, Ponzi Finance and Global Liquidity Meltdown:
Lessons from Minsky (City Univ. London Ctr. of Int'l Politics, Working Paper No. CUTP/002,2008)
("while the process of securitisation has made many assets highly tradable, the 'bundling together' of
such assets makes the task of evaluation price exposures, the nature of risks involved, as well as the
very identity of borrower and lender, virtually impossible."). Id. at 4. See also MARTIN NEIL BAILY,
ROBERT E. LITAN, & MATrHEW S. JOHNSON, BROOKINGS INST., THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 8 (2008) (observing that these "new financial innovations thrived in an environment of easy
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve and poor regulatory oversight.").
8. Mizen, supra note 6, at 532 (observing that "[n]ew assets were developed based on subprime
and other mortgages, which were then sold to investors in the form of repackaged debt securities of
increasing sophistication. These received high ratings and were considered safe; they also provided
good returns compared with more conventional asset classes.").
9. Michael Flynn, Anatomy of a Breakdown, REASON, Jan. 2009, at 1, 1.
10. STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, INDEP. INST., ANATOMY OF A TRAIN WRECK: CAUSES OF THE MORTGAGE
MELTDOWN 4 (2008); See also John C. Hull, The Credit Crunch of 2007: What Went Wrong? Why?
What Lessons Can Be Learned? 2 (Univ. of Toronto, Working Paper, 2008) (arguing that "the bubble
was largely fuelled by mortgage lending practices.").
11. See Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York:
Stabilizing the Financial Markets and the Economy (Oct. 15, 2008): "Large inflows of capital into the
United States and other countries stimulated a reaching for yield, an underpricing of risk, excessive
leverage, and the development of complex and opaque financial instruments that seemed to work well
during the credit boom but have been shown to be fragile under stress." WARREN COATS, THE U.S.
MORTGAGE MARKET: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 4 (2008). See also The Rise in Home
Ownership, Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. Econ. Letter No. 2006-30 (Nov. 3, 2006) (tracing the rise in home
ownership to the relaxing of lending standards). See also Demystifying the Credit Crunch, Arthur D.
Little (July 2008) at 4 (noting that residential homebuyers took advantage of low interest rates and the
volume of mortgage origination soared).
12. Hull, supra note 10, at 2 (observing that "[m]ortgage lenders thought they were taking very
little risk during the 2000 to 2007 period because the value of the collateral underlying their loans was
rising very fast.").
13. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the home ownership rate in the United States actually
peaked in 2004, hitting 69.2 percent. The rate, which remained in the mid-60s in percentage terms for
most of the 1990s, has remained above 67 percent for every quarter since 2000. See U.S. CENSUS
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speculators looking to quickly buy and resell--or "flip"-homes for a
profit. 14 As with all bubbles, the lessons of history, including lessons about
the default rates of poor credit, were largely ignored." As housing prices
stopped rising and the housing bubble started to deflate in 2006, however,
mortgage lenders were saddled with larger than expected losses as
borrowers ended up in foreclosures in significant numbers. 16  The
correction of this overexpansion and over-availability of credit has resulted
in oversized losses by financial institutions throughout the world and has
led to an almost unprecedented global tightening of credit. 17
Experts have pointed to several factors that combined to cause the
problems in the United States' housing sector to spill more broadly into the
global credit markets. 8 The trigger of the crisis can be traced to the loss of
confidence in the market for mortgage-backed securities.' 9 Following the
BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, ANNUAL STATISTICS: 2007, TABLE 5:
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1968 TO 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/ www/housing/hvs/qtr 108/qlO8tab5.html.
14. See LIEBOWITZ, supra note 10, at 4 (pointing out that "[e]stimates are that one quarter of all
home sales were speculative sales of this nature."). See also BAILY ET AL., supra note 7, at 7
(commenting that "[1]ike traditional asset price bubbles, expectations of future price increases
developed and were a significant factor in inflating home prices.").
15. Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 4.
16. According to RealtyTrac, total foreclosure filings in the United States in 2007 numbered
2,203,295, representing a 74.99 percent and 148.33 percent increase from 2006 and 2005, respectively.
According to the same statistics, 1.033 percent of all United States households were in foreclosure at
the end of 2007. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007
(Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?
ChannellD=9&ItemlD=3988&accnt-64847. See LIEBOWITZ, supra note 10, at 15-17 (asserting that
"[t]he immediate cause of the rise in mortgage defaults is fairly obvious-it was the reversal in the
remarkable price appreciation of homes that occurred from 1998 until the second quarter of 2006" and
"[t]he increase in foreclosures began rising virtually the minute housing prices stopped rising.").
17. See Hull, supra note 10, at 2. See also Bill Gross, So CQish, PIMCO INVESTMENT OUTLOOK.
Nov. 2008, http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2008/IO+Gross+
November+2008+So+CQish.htm (noting that "[t]he past era can best be described as a more than half-
century build up in credit extension and levered finance."); Roger C. Altman, supra note 15, at 4
(noting that "[t]he crisis' underlying cause was the (invariably lethal) combination of very low interest
rates and unprecedented levels of liquidity.").
18. See COATS, supra note 11, at 5. See also Promoting Bank Liquidity and Lending Through
Deposit Insurance, Hope for Homeowners, and Other Enhancements: Hearing Before H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 11 th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Edward R. Morrison, Professor of Law,
Columbia Law School), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/
morrison020309.pdf. describing the causal chain that beginning with a rise in home foreclosures,
leading to a deterioration in the balance sheet of banks and spilling into the lending markets); INT'L
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING,
MICROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY (2008), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/
fl/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf (describing the link between the U.S. housing market and the financial
crisis); Edward L. Glaeser, Why We Should Let Housing Prices Keep Falling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/why-we-should-let-housing-prices-keep-falling/
(offering that the current crisis stems from "large numbers of investors betting, unsuccessfully, on real
estate", and has resulted in the entire global system being put at risk).
19. Stanislav lvanov, Svetoslav Trapkov, & Krassimir Petrov, The Tentacles of the Credit Crisis,
FINANCIAL SENSE EDITORIALS, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/petrov/2008/
Spring 2009
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
August 2007 collapse of two Bear Steams hedge funds that were heavily
exposed to subprime mortgages, the price of mortgage-backed securities
fell, as the market adjusted to reflect the risk of an investment in the asset
class.20  As a result, activity in the secondary market for mortgage backed
securities began to slow dramatically. 21  With asset prices and market
liquidity dropping as mortgage-backed securities plunged into crisis, the
funding needs of financial institutions increased. All of these factors
produced a dramatic increase in banking sector demand for liquidity,
bringing many credit markets to a virtual halt. 23  In addition, any efforts
toward a solution have been hindered by the fact that the new global
financial system was "built on highly interconnected confidence, which,
once dissipated, is difficult to resurrect.'
24
11 10.html.
20. See Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital Management: It's a Short-Term Memory, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at BU1 (noting that "it was Bear that sounded the first shot in the current
mortgage crisis" and "[a]s foreclosures kept rising, other institutions suffered losses and the crisis
spread."). For a lucid description of the troubles at the Bear Steams hedge funds and the fallout that
followed, see Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 106.
21. COATS, supra note 11, at 5 (also noting that, following the disclosure that the underwriting
standards had been misrepresented, originators also "took back" mortgage related products, "creating
the need for additional liquidity to fund them.").
22. This "liquidity spiral" results from the fact that the collateral value of the assets on the balance
sheets of borrowers erodes and margins rise or investors are unable to roll over their short-term
liabilities. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, 23 J.
ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2009, at 77. See also Timothy Geitner, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Welcoming Remarks at the Second New York Fed-Princeton University Liquidity Conference,
Restoring Market Liquidity in a Credit Crisis (Dec. 13, 2007) (noting that "the sharp deterioration in the
value of nonprime mortgage securities and the resulting increase in uncertainty about the value of a
much larger amount of financial assets exposed to that risk ... produced a large unexpected increase in
demand for funding from banks at the same time the banks confronted a reduced capacity to raise
financing."); Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Risk Minds
Conference, International Center for Business Information, Geneva, Switzerland, Assessing the
Potential for Instability in Financial Markets (Dec. 8, 2008) (observing that "risk managers did not fully
contemplate the possibility that many participants would need to unwind their positions at the same
time, that such actions might present substantial losses for several key counterparties, and that collateral
posted as protection for positions would fall in value at the same time.").
23. COATS, supra note 11, at 5. See also Special Report on Regulatory Reform, Congressional
Oversight Panel (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter Congressional Oversight Panel] at 6, observing:
The first cracks were evident in the subprime mortgage market and in the secondary
market for mortgage-related securities. From there, the crisis spread to nearly every
comer of the financial sector, both at home and abroad, taking down some of the
most venerable names in the investment banking and insurance businesses and
crippling others, wreaking havoc in the credit markets, and brutalizing equity
markets worldwide.
Id.
24. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., DOES THE WORLD NEED SECURITIZATION? YES, AND SIX
ACTIONS TO RESTART THE MARKET 5 2008). See also Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham,
Beyond Fairness: The Economic and Legal Case for a Sweeping Federal Mortgage Modification
Mandate, WASH. U. ST. LOuIS, Mar. 22, 2009, http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/beyond-
fairness-the-economic-and-legal-case-for-a-sweeping-federal-mortgage-modification-mandate/
(providing an analysis of the contagion of the housing downturn and offering a sweeping prescription
Vol. 5:2
BEWARE OF RISK EVERYWHERE
The President's Working Group offered the following assessment of
the current situation:
Since mid-2007, financial markets have been in turmoil. Soaring
delinquencies on US subprime mortgages were the primary trigger of
recent events. However, that initial shock both uncovered and
exacerbated other weaknesses in the global financial system. Because
financial markets are interconnected, both across asset classes and
countries, the impact has been widespread... uncertainty about asset
valuations in illiquid markets and about financial institutions'
exposures to asset price changes left investors and markets jittery.
25
These problems associated with housing finance reveal broader
failings, including inadequate market discipline and poor credit and
liquidity risk management by many financial firms.26 This Article hopes to
make some small contribution in assisting future decision makers to be
better prepared to anticipate and manage these risks, to recognize when
markets have moved far upfield from their original theoretical
underpinnings and to retain an appropriate level of vigilance with respect to
their role in advising these firms in the future. More than anything else,
this Article hopes to encourage attorneys and future attorneys to approach
all products and policies in the financial world with a healthy skepticism.
If it's too good to be true, it probably is!
III. BEWARE OF RISK EVERYWHERE
Warren Buffett observed that "you only learn who has been
swimming naked when the tide goes out.''27 If this is the case, the global
financial markets over the past ten years most closely resemble a nudist
colony.
for abating its continued metastasizing effects).
25. See Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments, The President's Working Group on
Financial Markets, 9 (March 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/
pwgpolicy statemkturmoil_03122008.pdf.
26. See Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Money Marketeers of New
York University, New York, New York, The Promise and Peril of the New Financial Architecture
(Nov. 6, 2008). See also President Barack Obama, Remarks upon the Swearing-in of Treasury
Secretary Timothy F. Geithner (Jan. 26, 2009):
[The financial system] has been badly weakened by an era of irresponsibility, a
series of imprudent and dangerous decisions on Wall Street, and an unrelenting
quest for profit with too little regard for risk, too little regulatory scrutiny, and too
little accountability. The result has been a devastating loss of trust and confidence
in our economy, our financial markets, and our government.
Id. Cf Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Private, Blunter Bush Declares, 'Wall Street Got Drunk', N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2008, at A18 (quoting then President Bush as declaring, in a less patrician manner, that "Wall
Street got drunk.").
27. Chairman's Letter, Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Annual Report 1 (Feb. 2008).
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Perhaps history's most famous nudist was the emperor in Hans
Christian Anderson's classic "The Emperor's New Clothes." In his 1837
tome, Anderson told the story of the emperor of a prosperous city who
hires two rogues promising to make him the finest suit from the most
beautiful cloth. The emperor, unable to see the (non-existent) clothes,
admires their magnificence for fear of appearing stupid or a simpleton.
Encouraged by his advisors and mispricing the risk to his reputation, the
emperor embarks on a grand parade through the capital buck naked while
his sycophantic subjects fawn over his supposed new threads. It is not until
a young boy cries out that "the Emperor has no clothes" that the whole
charade comes to a crashing end, leaving the emperor exposed-literally!
The market turmoil of the past two years coincides with further
erosion of confidence in what financial institutions and other market
participants knew-or thought they knew-about the environment in which
they were operating.28  As a result, many banks, hedge funds, financial
institutions and individuals are reeling from the effects of having been
"exposed" to certain risks that they failed to see, underestimated, mispriced
or ignored.29 Some of the specific risks that market participants face are
examined in this section of the Article.
First, the risk-free asset and its selection and application are
discussed. This examination reveals that the current crisis should serve as a
clarion call, signaling a fundamental shift in the measurement of risk across
all asset classes. After suggesting that the financial community abandon
the reflexive use of the United States Treasury Bill as the long-held proxy
for the risk-free asset (or, at least, examine the implications its continued
use), this section of the Article questions whether modem finance's current
linear approach to understanding risk is sufficient at all. Next, this section
of the Article highlights how financial institutions in this current crisis
failed to heed some of the simple lessons of the Long Term Capital
Management ("LTCM") failure of the late 1990s. Despite the rather recent
example of LTCM, today's financial institutions repeated many of its
mistakes-albeit it on a much broader scale. Most notably, in the recent
crisis, financial institutions had grown too comfortable with risk, gaining a
false sense of complacency from risk management procedures that failed,
among other things, to adequately account for the fact that liquidity and
correlation change in turbulent markets. Skilled financial engineers and
risk managers, ever confident in their ability to understand, measure, model
and manage risk, simply missed the mark. Finally, as the example of the
auction rate securities market highlights, blindspots can come in super-size.
28. See Warsh, supra note 26.
29. See DAVID SMICK, THE WORLD IS CURVED: HIDDEN DANGERS TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 196
(2008) (observing that risk in the market over the last dozen years has been severely underpriced).
Vol. 5:2
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Entire markets can grow from a faulty premise that should have been
obvious. While this Article only explores a few select examples, there
seem to be no limit to the number of instances in the past cycle where
market participants operated with either a lack of awareness of or a lack of
respect for risk. Investors and their counselors alike-much like
Anderson's emperor-should all benefit from a friendly reminder to
beware of risk everywhere-especially where you don't see it.
A. RISK AND THE RISK-FREE RATE
Usually, we associate the concept of "risk" with the probability that
something bad will happen.30 Risk comes with a blind spot too, in that
people "tend not to be able to anticipate a future they have never personally
experienced.' In finance, however, risk simply measures the amount of
uncertainty involved in future outcomes.32 Risk, for an investor, is
measured by the variance of the actual return of the underlying asset from
its expected return.33 A risk-free asset, therefore, offers actual returns that
are always equal to its expected return. 34 Though a truly risk-free asset can
only exist in theory, most academics and professionals employ short-dated
35government bonds as a proxy. Consider, for example, an investor with a
30. See Stephen M. Penner, International Investment and the Prudent Investor Rule: The Trustee 's
Duty to Consider International Investment Vehicles, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 601, 623-24. Cf. ASWATH
DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF
ANY ASSET 61 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter DAMODARAN VALUATION] (noting that risk must be defined
more broadly because, it can be the reason for higher returns for firms that use it to their advantage).
31. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24, 29.
32. Penner, supra note 30, at 624. Cf Lowenstein, supra note 20, at BUI ("[r]isk-say, in a card
game-can be quantified, but financial markets are subject to uncertainty, which is far less precise.").
See also PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 3
(3d ed. 2007) (characterizing risk as "the volatility of unexpected outcomes, which can represent the
value of assets, equity or earnings.").
33. Penner, supra note 30, at 624. See also Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 8 J. FIN. 77,
89 (1952) (observing that the variance of returns is equal to the square of the standard deviation of
returns). See also Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic
Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO
N.U.L.REv. 189, 243 (1998) ("Economic theory teaches that the real risk of an investment is defined by
the uncertainty, or variability, of its expected retum or, in other words, the average amount of variation
among all the possible returns from the investment."). See also DAMODARAN VALUATION, supra note
30, at 64 (observing that the standard deviation or variance of actual returns around an expected return
has become the most widely accepted measure of risk).
34. DAMODARAN VALUATION, supra note 30, at 54.
35. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 30, at 629 ("The archetypical risk-free asset is U.S. Treasury
bills" and "[t]hese assets are considered essentially risk-free because the risk of default is infinitesimal,
although inflation and rising interest rates can affect their returns."). See also Rapp, supra note 33, at
243-44 (qualifying Treasury securities as risk-free). Cf PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION
ECONOMICS, 171-72 (2009) ("U.S. government debt is as safe as anything on the planet, not because the
United States is the most responsible nation on earth but because a world in which the U.S. government
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one-year time horizon purchasing a one-year U.S. Treasury Bill with a 5
percent expected return. As Professor Damodaran observes, "the actual
return that this investor would have on this investment will always be 5
percent, which is equal to the expected return."
36
There are two basic conditions that must be satisfied in order for an
asset's actual return to equal its expected return absolutely. First, the asset
can have no risk of default.37 In effect, the requirement that the risk-free
asset be absent default risk eliminates any security issued by a private
firm. 8 While governments are not necessarily better run than private
firms, they do have the power to print currency and, therefore, they are able
to fulfill their promises-at least in nominal terms.39 Second, in order for
an asset's return to equal its expected return, there can be no reinvestment
risk.40  The short maturity of the proxy bond is meant to sidestep this
problem-minimizing any reinvestment risk by shortening the term of the
obligation.
Financial markets are inherently risky and extreme price swings are
the norm-not aberrations that can be ignored.4' An understanding of the
risk-free asset, therefore, only tells an investor so much. Because the risk-
free rate of return is available to an investor without any default risk or
reinvestment risk, it follows that an investor requires additional reward in
the form of a higher rate of interest to invest in a risky asset-an asset that
includes the risk of default and reinvestment.42 The question of just how
collapses would be one in which pretty much everything else collapses too.").
36. DAMODARAN VALUATION, supra note 30, at 62.
37. Default occurs when a debtor has not met its legal obligations under the debt contract. A
default can occur as a result of a debtor's failure to make a payment when due or the violation of a loan
covenant and may result from the debtor's unwillingness or inability to pay its debt.
38. DAMODARAN VALUATION, supra note 30, at 154 ("[Elven the largest and safest firms have
some measure of default risk.").
39. Of course, the government of the United States has never defaulted on a governmental debt in
its history. The Confederate States of America did default, however, during its war against the Union
of the United States during the Civil War. But cf Alex J. Pollock, Was There Ever a Default on U.S.
Treasury Debt?, AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Jan. 21, 2009, http://spectator.org/archives/2009/01/2l/was-
there-ever-a-default-on-us. See also Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, & Alan J. Marcus, INVESTMENTS, 138 (4th
ed. 1999) ("[A] U.S. Treasury bond that offers a 'risk-free' nominal rate of return is not truly a risk-free
investment-it does not guarantee the future purchasing power of its cash flow.").
40. Reinvestment risk describes the risk resulting from the fact that earnings (interest or dividends)
from an investment may not be able to earn the same rate of return as the original invested funds upon
reinvestment. Falling interest rates over the term of a bond, for example, may prevent an investor from
reinvesting the coupon payments in an investment that generates the same rate of return as the original
bond.
41. See generally BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF
MARKETS 20 (Basic Books, 2004); See also John C. Bogle, Remarks before the Risk Management
Association, Black Monday and Black Swans (Oct. I1, 2007) ("Changes in the nature and structure of
our financial markets-and the radical shift in its participants-are making shocking and unexpected
market aberrations ever more probable."). See also Congressional Oversight Panel supra note 23, at 2
(noting that "[f]inancial markets are inherently volatile and prone to extremes.").
42. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 15, at 4 ("One basic law of finance is that yields on loans are
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much reward is required for an investor to absorb a certain amount of risk,
however, is the Holy Grail of modem finance.
The use of variance as a measure of risk has at least two basic
problems.n3 First, upside and downside variation of returns are treated
similarly-meaning that a stock that has risen significantly appears "as
risky" as a stock that has fallen by the same amount. Second, the
possibility of large payoffs and sizable price jumps might make an
investment more or less desirable. Such attributes, however, are beyond
the scope of analysis based solely on expected return and variance. These
issues notwithstanding, in modem finance, the capital asset pricing model
("CAPM") is the standard for estimating the required rates of return for
different assets moving out on the risk continuum from the risk-free asset.44
After making certain assumptions about investors and markets, 45 CAPM
attempts to quantify the higher return that investors demand in exchange
for holding a risky asset instead of the risk-free asset.4 6 In fact, CAPM
provides that, in competitive markets, expected returns will increase
linearly with an asset's beta. 7 Therefore, all investments must plot along a
inversely proportional to credit quality: the stronger the borrower, the lower the yield, and vice versa.").
43. See DAMODARAN VALUATION, supra note 30, at 64 (discussing the limitations of variance as a
risk measure).
44. See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964) (observing that an investor "may obtain a higher expected rate
of return on his holdings only by incurring additional risk."); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets
and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REv. ECON. &
STATISTICS 13 (1965). See also Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing
Model: Theory and Evidence J. Econ. Persps., Summer 2004 at 25 (observing that CAPM is the
centerpiece of MBA investments courses). See also DAMODARAN VALUATION, supra note 30, at 69
(observing that CAPM is the risk-reward model that has "been in use the longest and is still the standard
in most real-world analyses"). See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1984) (arguing that the Efficient Market Hypothesis is
the contextual backdrop for all serious discussion of financial regulation).
45. The original Sharpe and Lintner versions of CAPM contained four assumptions. First, the
models assumed that investors seek low volatility and high return on average. Second, similar to many
models in finance, these models assume that taxes, illiquidities and transaction costs'can be disregarded.
Third, the models assume that all investors have access to the same data and make the same conclusions
with respect to expected returns, volatilities and correlations of market securities. Finally, the original
CAPM models assume that investors only establish long positions in securities and can borrow without
limit at the risk-free rate. See Sharpe, supra note 44; Lintner, supra note 44.
46. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS AND FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE, 215 (9th Ed., 2008) (noting that the market risk premium, representing the
additional return expected for holding the risky asset over and above the return offered by the risk-free
asset, has averaged 7.6 percent per year.). See also Rapp, supra note 33, at 241 (observing that
"[i]nvestors will sacrifice returns to avoid risk and demand greater returns to accept it.").
47. Beta represents a measure of an individual security's sensibility to market movements.
Statistically, the beta of stock i is defined as 13i = (o. O-m) where crim is the covariance between stock i's
return and the market return and 2,, is the variance of the market return. See BREALEY et al. supra note
46, at 193. See also Rapp, supra note 33, at 245 (observing that "[u]nder CAPM, the required rate of
return on an investment is a linear function of the security's beta, its systemic risk."). See also Fama &
French, supra note 44, at 5 (observing that beta measures the sensitivity of an asset's return to variation
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sloping line, known as the security market line. The model states:
E(Ri) = Rf+ 3i (E(Rm) - Rf)
where:
E(Ri) is the expected return of the capital asset;
Rf is the risk-free rate of interest;
3i is the beta of the asset i;48
E(Rm) is the expected return of the market; and
(E(Rm) - Rf) is the market premium (or risk premium) representing
the expected market rate of return minus the risk-free rate of return.
A few observations about the CAPM formula are warranted. The fact
that a risk-free asset can only exist in theory remains undisputed. In light
of recent market events, however, the reflexive use of the T-Bill as a proxy
for the risk-free asset begs caution. Moreover, if the use of the T-Bill as a
proxy for the risk-free asset becomes strained, the effects of the error in the
Rf input of the CAPM formula will be felt across the entire risk spectrum-
from risk-free to the most risky assets. The implications of such an error
could be profound.
Perhaps the greatest evidence that U.S. Treasury bonds are not free
from default risk is the fact that credit default swaps are now readily
available with the United States government as the reference entity.49 In
in the market).
48. See A. LAWRENCE KOLBE, ET AL., THE COST OF CAPITAL: ESTIMATING THE RATE OF RETURN
FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 68-69 (1984) discusses the origins of beta:
An asset's beta combines the volatility of the asset's returns and the correlation of
those returns with other assets into a single measure. The first factor in beta is the
width of the average swing in the asset's value relative to the average swing in the
portfolio's value. This can be measured by the standard deviation of the asset's
returns divided by the standard deviation of the portfolio's returns. The second
factor in beta is the correlation between the asset's moves and the portfolio's
moves. A correlation of -1 implies the asset's returns always move up when the
portfolio's returns move up. A correlation of I implies the asset's returns always
move down when the portfolio's return moves up. A correlation of 0 implies the
asset and the portfolio move independent of each other.
49. See John Hull & Alan White, Valuing Credit Default Swaps I. No Counterparty Default Risk J.
Derivatives, Fall 2009, at 29, 29, offering the following description of credit default swaps:
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of
a default by particular company. The company is known as the reference entity and
a default by the company is known as a credit event. The buyer of the insurance
obtains the right to sell a particular bond issued by the company for its par value
when a credit event occurs. The bond is known as the reference obligation and the
total par value of the bond that can be sold is known as the swap's notional
principal.
The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the seller until the end of the life
of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. A credit event usually requires a final
accrual payment by the buyer. The swap is then settled by either physical delivery
or in cash. If the terms of the swap require physical delivery, the swap buyer
delivers the bonds to the seller in exchange for their par value. When there is cash
settlement, the calculation agent polls dealers to determine the mid-market price, Q,
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fact, in recent months, the price of credit default swap protection on assets
issued by the United States government has increased dramatically.50 Were
these obligations truly "risk free," there would be no need for any investor
to seek credit default swap protection. Moreover, absent such risk, a credit
default swap with a United States reference obligation would have little
cost due to the certainty that the protection buyer would never be able to
collect because a credit event would absolutely not happen. Instead, the
rising price of the protection suggests that the possibility of default, while
still quite remote, might be increasing in likelihood.51
of the reference obligation some specified number of days after the credit event.
The cash settlement is then (100-Q) percent of the notional principal.
Id.
50. See Karen Brettell, U.S. Treasuries' Debt Protection Costs Jump to Record, REUTERS, July 11,
2008 (observing "[t]he cost to insure Treasury debt with credit default swaps jumped to 16.5 basis
points, or $16,500 per year for five years to insure $10 million in debt, from 8 basis points on
Thursday"). See also Abigail Moses, U.S. Treasury Credit-Default Swaps Increase to Record, CMA
Says, BLOOMBERG, July 15, 2008 (noting that "[tihe cost of protecting against losses on Treasuries
soared to a record on concern that the U.S. government faces higher liabilities with its support for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.").
51. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Emperor's Dangerous Clothes, ECONOMIST'S VOICE, Apr.
2008, at 2 (noting that "[u]nless we change our path, the nation will default on its creditors" and
"[a]nyone who thinks the U.S. is immune from fiscal meltdown and high inflation, if not,
hyperinflation, should think again."). See also Nick Szabo, So Much for the "Risk-Free Investment",
UNENUMERATED, July 17, 2008, http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2008/07/so-much-for-risk-free-
investment.html (observing "that the risk of overt default has now substantially increased means that
investors are are [sic] recognizing that the unprecedented revenue-generating combination created in
1913 - IRS... and the Federal Reserve ... is not indestructible."). See also James West, U.S. Debt
Default, Dollar Collapse Altogether Likely, SEEKING ALPHA, Feb. 3, 2009, http://seekingalpha.
com/article/118103-u-s-debt-default-dollar-collapse-altogether-likely (last visited Feb. 13, 2009)
(asserting that the prospect of a U.S. default on its debt is "not just likely" but "inevitable, and
imminent"). Such worries are not necessarily a new phenomenon. See also The Junkification of
American T-bonds, THE ECONOMIST, May 27, 1989 at 77 (observing that investors "may become
worried about the Treasury's willingness and ability to honour its commitments" following the "blank
cheques drawn on the taxpayer" by the Resolution Trust Company). Michael Kinsley, The Upside-
Down Economics of Consumption, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.realclearmarkets.
com/articles/2009/02/the upsidedowneconomicsof.co.html (noting that "[s]o far.. .there have been
only the faintest whispers about the possibility of an actual default by the U.S. government. Somewhat
louder whispers can be heard, though, about the gradual default known as inflation."). See also William
Pesek, China Risks the Madoff Treatment for Treasuries, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHOuXTmCv6lY (commenting that
"[tihe reason credit-rating companies aren't swarming around and threatening to downgrade the U.S. is
trust... That doesn't mean critics who say the [U.S. Treasury] market has become the world's biggest
pyramid scheme are wrong."). Ajay Kamalakaran, China to Stick with U.S. Bonds, REUTERS, Feb. 12,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSBNG440224200-
90212 (noting that China will continue to buy U.S. Treasury bonds even though it believes that the
dollar will depreciate); Floyd Norris, Foreign Investors Wary of Long-Term US. Securities, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at B3 (observing that foreign investors have flown to short-term U.S. Treasury
Bills, but were net sellers of longer term American securities in every month from July through
December of 2008). See also, Keith Bradsher, China Cuts Bond Buys from U.S. and Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at BI (noting that China's foreign reserves grew in the first quarter of 2009 at the
slowest pace in nearly eight years as China's leaders are growing increasingly nervous "about their
country's huge exposure to America's financial well-being:); Roger Lowenstein, No Safety in Numbers,
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As CAPM provides, if the risk-free proxy is not truly risk-free, its
expected return must be calculated as any other risky asset-based on the
product of (i) the difference of the spread of the market's expected return
over the true risk-free rate multiplied by (ii) its beta. Also, if the risk-free
proxy is not truly free from risk, the data of the risk-free proxy cannot be
used as an accurate input into the various pricing formulae that require a
risk-free rate as an input. If, therefore, the current risk profile for the
obligations of the United States is anything but a temporary anomaly, the
effects of this increased riskiness could be profound across all asset classes.
Many different comers of modem financial theory rely on a risk-free input
in calculating the value of an asset.
52
Beyond the mechanical and practical implications of a risky T-Bill on
CAPM, there remains the question of whether the CAPM approach is
effective at all-or whether, instead, modem finance has been mis-
measuring risk for quite some time.53 The heart of the argument against
CAPM attacks two assumptions that underlie the model, with critics
charging that CAPM simply cannot be supported after any careful analysis
of market data. To understand the critique, however, a "random walk"
through the history of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and its ancestry is
required.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY
In 1900, a French mathematician named Louis Bachelier started a
revolution with a little-known dissertation applying the field of probability
to the market for French government bonds. 4 Bachelier's work, often
called the "random walk," postulates that prices will go uR and down with
equal probability, as a fair coin will fall on heads or tails. These theories
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 22, 2009, at 11 (offering that U.S. Treasuries, although widely regarded as
"riskless", bear more risk than many appreciate, and promising that the promised rates of return may
"turn out to be worth less over time" because of the effects of inflation). Cf Pollock, supra note 39
(observing that the decision in 1933 by the United States government-supported by a resolution of
Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court-not to honor the "unambiguous obligation to pay in gold"
amounted to a depreciation of the currency and an intentional repudiation of its obligations).
52. The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model, generally accepted as the preferred method for
pricing options today, for example, requires a risk-free interest rate input and relies on the notion that it
is possible to borrow and lend at a constant risk-free interest rate.
53. See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 24 (asserting that, indeed, "[wie have been
mis-measuring risk.").
54. Louis Bachelier, Theory of Speculation, in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET
PRICES 17 (Paul H. Cootner ed., rev. ed. 1964).
55. See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 9. See also Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient
Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, J. Econ. Persps., Winter 2003, at 59 (noting that the "logic of the
random walk idea is that if the flow of information is unimpeded and information is immediately
reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow's price change will reflect only tomorrow's news and will be
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were honed over time as it was observed, for example, that the variation in
prices is measurable. The empirical rule provided mathematicians with a
yardstick to measure a rough estimate of probability given a particular
56standard deviation. As Bachelier's price movements were examined, it
was observed that they had certain properties. Specifically, few changes
were very large and, if plotted on graph paper, the histogram formed a bell
curve, with most of the small changes in price movement clustered around
the center and rarer big changes at the edges (or tails) of the bell."
Following up on the work of Bachelier, Eugene Fama offered the
Efficient Market Hypothesis ("EMH"),58 which posits that an ideal market
is informationally efficient, with all relevant information already priced
into a security today.59 Therefore, the theory prescribes that each price
change is independent from the last and, at any time, the actual price of a
security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value.60 Far from a proof of
market irrationality, randomly evolving stock prices are the necessary
consequence of intelligent investors competing to discover relevant
information on which to buy or sell stocks before their peers become aware
of the information.6' Chartists and technical analysts disagree with the
random walk model and create elaborate charts of the past price
movements of securities in an effort to predict future price movements. To
Fama, the independence assumption means that such chartist theories and
theories of fundamental analysis "are really the province of the market
independent of the price changes today.").
56. A standard deviation is a simple mathematical yardstick for measuring the scatter of data. The
standard deviation is a statistical measure of the dispersion around the mean. In a normal distribution,
approximately 68 percent of the observations would fall within a single standard deviation of the mean
and 95 percent of the observations would fall within two standard deviations of the mean. The
variance, discussed at note 72, infra, is the standard deviation squared. See generally, PETER L.
BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 127-28 (1996) (describing the
history of the standard deviation measure).
57. See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 10.
58. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383 [hereinafter Fama I]. Professor Paul Samuelson's work preceded Professor Fama's. See Paul
A. Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, INDUS. MGMT. REV.,
Spring 1965, at 41. In addition, Maurice Kendall is frequently credited with bringing the random walk
ideas to the attention of the community of economist in the 1950s.
59. See Fama I, supra note 58, at 383 (asserting that a "market in which prices always 'fully
reflect' available information is called 'efficient."'); Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market
Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan./Feb. 1995, reprinted from Sept./Oct. 1965, at 76 [hereinafter Fama II]
(positing that "[a]n 'efficient' market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational,
profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual
securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants.").
60. Fama 11, supra note 59, at 76 (observing that "[a] market where successive price changes in
individual securities are independent is, by definition, a random walk market.").
61. Zvi Bodie, et al., supra, note 39, at 329. See also BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 358
(observing that "[i]f past price changes could be used to predict future price changes, investors could
make easy profits.").
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professional and to a large extent teachers of finance. 62 Moreover, EMH
provides that such theories "are complete! without value"63 as "there is no
problem in timing purchases and sales" of a security. Instead, Fama
insists that an investor should be as comfortable buying a stock at anytime
versus another since it remains correctly priced by the efficient market.65
Today, there are three forms in which the efficient market hypothesis
is commonly stated-weak form efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency,
and strong form efficiency. These three levels are distinguished by the
degree of information reflected in the relevant security prices. In the weak
form of efficiency, prices reflect the information contained in the record of
past prices. Markets that display efficiency in the weak sense, therefore, do
not allow for consistently superior profits by studying past returns. Instead,
stocks follow a random walk. The weak form of the hypothesis has the
most empirical support of the three forms.66  The semi-strong form of
efficiency provides that markets incorporate the record of past prices and
all other published information about a security. In such a market, stock
prices will adjust immediately upon the publication of additional
information, thereby eliminating any excess profit that can be garnered
from the possession of such information.67 Finally, in a market that
displays characteristics of strong efficiency, prices reflect all information,
62. Fama II, supra note 59, at 75-76. See also Malkiel, supra note 55, at 59 (observing that, under
the principles of EMH, technical or fundamental analysis should not allow an investor to achieve
greater returns than a randomly generated portfolio).
63. Fama 11, supra note 59, at 75.
64. Id. at 76-77 (asserting that a "simple policy of buying and holding the security will be as good
as any more complicated mechanical procedure for timing purchases and sales.").
65. The EMH is not without its critics. In fact, as Professor Malkiel notes, "by the start of the
twenty-first century, the intellectual dominance of the efficient market hypothesis had become far less
universal." See Malkiel, supra note 55, at 60. Many economists began to explore the notion that stock
prices were, at least, partially predictable. Attacks on the pure EMH rationale have come from many
corners as academics have attempted to prove that pricing irregularities or patterns can appear and
persist for periods of time. Experts have attempted to prove, among others, (i) seasonal and day of the
week patterns, (ii) short-term momentum and "stickiness" of prices, (iii) patterns based on dividend
ratios, (iv) tendencies based on company size and (v) value versus growth anomalies. In the end, any of
these patterns that have been discovered might persist for some period of time but should fade away
without offering investors an opportunity for an outsized return. As Professor Malkiel points out, "[i]f
any $100 bills are lying around the stock exchanges of the world, they will not be there for long."
Malkiel, supra note 55, at 80.
66. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (Foundation
Press 6th ed. 2008).
67. In Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, (1988), the United States Supreme Court accepted the
semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. In adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory in
support of a violation of Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the Court observed
that "an investor who buys or sells stock at a price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity
of that price." Id. at 247. See also Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with
Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REv. 435 (1984) (analyzing
the fraud on the market theory); Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the
Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991) (examining the Court's analysis in the Basic Inc. case).
Vol. 5:2
BEWARE OF RISK EVERYWHERE
public and private.68
Around the same time that the random walk model was being
developed, Modem Portfolio Theory ("MPT") was emerging from the
mind of Harry Markowitz. 69 Built on the old adage "don't put all your eggs
in one basket," MPT expands the risk-reward tradeoff so prevalent in
modem financial thought. Namely, the theory provides that all investments
are reducible to the elements of risk and return. Investors, in turn, are risk
averse actors willing to sacrifice returns to avoid risk and demanding
greater returns to assume risk.7 ° MPT establishes that investors will best
address their risk aversion by investing in a portfolio of investments that
offers the greatest expected return for a given level of risk.7 In short, the
risk associated with spreading your money over multiple stocks is less than
investing in a single company's stock.
Under MPT, the expected return of a portfolio, the proxy for reward,
is simply the weighted arithmetic average of the returns of each of its
assets. Risk, in turn, is represented by the variance of the possible returns
around the expected return.72 MPT's breakthrough is that, with respect to a
portfolio's risk, no such rule (adding the risks of the individual components
of the portfolio) can be followed.73 In fact, because variations in returns on
individual investments may reduce the variance of returns on the entire
portfolio, portfolio risk is primarily a function of the degree of variance of
individual investments compared to the portfolio as a whole. 74 As a result,
investors benefit from holding a diversified portfolio instead of individual
securities. MPT also contends that, with respect to any security, two
68. The strong form of market efficiency has been contradicted by the fact that insiders can earn
extraordinary trading profits. See Nejat H. Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market
Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189 (1986).
69. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, J. FIN. 77 (1952) [hereinafter Markowitz fl. See also
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walk to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 567 (1994) (summarizing
Markowitz's contributions in historical context).
70. HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS (1959) [hereinafter MARXOWITZ II].
71. Cunningham, supra note 69, at 567.
72. Variance measures the dispersion of the returns and is represented mathematically by the sum
of the expected squared deviations from the expected return.






+2(X1X 2 PI2 G1G2)
where:
x, and x2 represent the proportion of the portfolio represented in stocks 1 and
2, respectively;
G12 and 022 represent the variances of those stock's returns;
P120102 represents the covariance between stocks 1 and 2; and
P12 represents the correlation of stocks 1 and 2.
74. Covariance is a measurement of the co-movements between two variables. See Markowitz I,
supra note 69, at 79.
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elements of risk can be distinguished: systemic and idiosyncratic. Systemic
risk arises from the tendency of a security to vary in lockstep with the
overall market in which it is traded. Systemic risks, therefore, cannot be
diversified away. Examples of these risks include interest rates, recessions
and wars. Idiosyncratic or specific risk, on the other hand, arises from the
particular peculiarities of the individual stock being investigated. These
risks represent the portion of an asset's return that is not correlated with
general market moves. As such, this risk is specific to individual assets and
can be diversified away as the number of assets in the portfolio is
increased.
Armed with the Random Walk, the Efficient Market Hypothesis and
Modem Portfolio Theory, economists "developed a very elaborate toolkit
for analyzing markets, measuring the 'variance' and 'betas' of different
securities and classifying investment portfolios by the probability of risk.,
75
Despite the confidence of economists, however, the track record of modem
finance is littered with failures. Rather than proceeding cautiously in light
of Fama's own warning that, in an uncertain world, "no amount of
empirical testing is sufficient to establish the validity of a hypothesis
beyond any shadow of doubt, 7 6 Wall Street risk managers embraced risk
with an arrogance and a hubris that would ensure that, sooner or later, they
would be hoisted by their own petard. As the market turmoil embodied in
the Russian Debt Crisis, the Asian Crisis, the collapse of the Mexican Peso
and the bursting of the Internet Bubble all show, these theories, although
neat and elegant, continue to underestimate the frequency and magnitude of
rare events. Finally, the recent Credit Crisis and its magnitude are far
beyond what any of these models might have predicted. Today, we are left
to make no conclusion other than that the theory is flawed!78
The flaw, it seems, is in the heavy reliance on two assumptions to
support today's basic approach-that price changes are statistically
independent and they are normally distributed. First, financial price
movements do seem to have a memory. In fact, "different kinds of price
75. See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 11.
76. Fama I, supra note 59, at 78. See also BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 202 (warning that "[w]e
cannot even be 100 percent certain that the sun will rise tomorrow morning: the ancients who predicted
that event were themselves working with a limited sample of the history of the universe.").
77. Today's smartest investors understand this risk. See e.g. MOHAMED EL-ERIAN, WHEN
MARKETS COLLIDE: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE AGE OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 279
(2008) (describing the need for "tail insurance" to protect against events where the probability is small,
but the consequences are huge). EI-Erian also describes "Pascal's Wager," an argument set out by the
French mathematician and physicist, who reflected on the relative costs and benefits of believing in
God, in the face of a lack of proof as to whether he exists. As EI-Erian describes Pascal's thinking,
"because of the consequences of potentially being wrong, the expected value (probability times
consequences) of believing in God always exceeded that of not believing." See El-Erian at 279-80.
78. See, e.g., George Soros, The Game Changer, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at 8 (calling for a
prompt a rejection of the efficient market hypothesis and a thorough reconsideration of the regulatory
regime).
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series exhibit different degrees of memory."7 9 Second, in the context of the
study of financial markets, the adoption of the bell curve seems motivated
by mathematical convenience, not realism. 80  In fact, market returns
suggest that prices are vex? far from "normally distributed," resisting the
confines of the bell curve. Rare and unpredictably large deviations have a
dramatic effect on long-term returns-but "risk" and "variance" simply
disregard them.82
79. See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 12. See also Roger Lowenstein, WHEN
GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 72 (2000) [hereinafter
LOWENSTEIN] (observing "markets have memories. Sometimes a trend will continue because traders
expect (or fear) that it will.").
80. Benoit Mandelbrot & Nassim Nicholas Taleb, How the Finance Gurus Get Risk All Wrong,
FORTUNE, July 11, 2005, at 99. See also NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN 269 (2006)
(commenting that "selecting the Gaussian while invoking some general law appears to be convenient.").
See also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 79, at 72 (quoting Eugene Fama as noting that "[I]ife always has a fat
tail."). See also Bogle, supra note 41 (pointing out that "the application of the laws of probability to
our financial markets is badly misguided."). See also THE CLIFTON GROUP, SHORTFALLS OF
TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL RISK MODELS, 1 (2008):
The traditional financial risk model is a normally distributed bell curve. Bell curves
are useful for modeling many statistical trends of large, random populations;
however, we believe their application has been mistakenly extrapolated into the
world's financial realm. Normal distributions are founded on certain assumptions:
events occur independently, extremes are very rare and outliers have minimal effect
on expected outcomes. All these assumptions-the assumptions in which the
distribution's effectiveness is founded on-are violated when applied to financial
markets.
Id.
81. See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 12. No less than Eugene Fama himself
sounded this warning, offering: "If the population of price changes is strictly normal, on the average for
any stock ... an observation more than five standard deviations from the mean should be observed
about once every 7,000 years. In fact, such observations seem to occur every three to four years." See
Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 39 J. BUS. 34 (1965).
82. Mandelbrot & Taleb, supra, note 80, at 99 (pointing to the collapse of Enron's stock price or
the spectacular rise of Cisco's stock price throughout the 1990s as two examples). See also
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 79, at 72 (observing that economists theorized that even if the life of the
Universe were repeated one billion times, the returns of Black Monday would have remained
"unlikely"). See also Richard Hoppe, It's Time We Buried Value-at-Risk, RISK PROFESSIONAL, 14
July/Aug. 1999 (noting that the October 19, 1987, crash was a 28 sigma close-to-close event and
observing that "something is rotten in the foundation of the statistical edifice that produced the
probability estimates."). See also MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 41, at 13, observing:
From 1916 to 2003, the daily index movements of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average do not spread out on graph paper like a simple bell curve. The far edges
flare too high: too many big changes. Theory suggests that over that time there
should be fifty-eight days when the Dow moved more than 3.4 percent; in fact,
there were 1,001. Theory predicts six days of index swings beyond 4.5 percent; in
fact, there were 366. And index swings of more than 7 percent should come once
every 300,000 years; in fact, the twentieth century saw forty-eight such days.
Truly, a calamitous era that insists on flaunting all predictions. Or, perhaps, our
assumptions are wrong.
Id. See also Anatole Kaletsky, Now is the Time for a Revolution in Economic Thought, TIMES
(London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 37 (observing that Mandelbrot's approach "appear[s] to work far better in
modeling extreme movements in financial markets than the conventional methods based on statistically
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Criticism of the modem financial theories is nothing new.83 For a
long time, however, these critiques have been largely ignored by a financial
services apparatus heavily invested in the EMH and its progeny. One of
the most thoughtful criticisms from the legal community was Professor
Cunningham's From Random Walk to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. In his 1994 article,
Professor Cunningham laments the linear methodology and thought of the
EMH which, he argues, have been rendered obsolete by chaos models
applying non-linear techniques to understanding the financial markets.
Some fifteen years after Professor Cunningham's work, his advice to
lawyers to "feel obligated to confront sooner rather than later"84 the
methodological shift in financial economic theory away from the linear
thinking of the Efficient Market Hypothesis seems more important than
ever. 85 Having failed to heed his advice the first time, and instead
doubling-down on the troubling modem financial theories born of the
EMH, market participants find themselves picking up the pieces of a
financial house of cards.86 In particular, his warning against excessive
reliance on the linearity that comes with capital market theory warrants
closer examination.
As Professor Cunningham observes, linearity means proportionality.87
In effect, a change in one variable, in modem financial theory, produces a
proportionate change in another variable.88 In CAPM, for example, the
expected risk premium varies in direct proportion to beta.89 It must be the
case, however, that certain changes result in outsized consequences. As
Professor Cunningham tells it, "the one-ounce straw that breaks the one-ton
camel's back is non-linear because the cause is utterly disproportionate to
the effect." 90 Capital markets are no different, as an incremental bit of
information finally results in plummeting prices that are more a response to
the cumulative effect of many other bits of information than a response to
that single last bit. In our most recent economic cycle, for instance, the
'normal' distributions"). See also SMICK, supra note 29, at 196 (observing that risk in the market over
the last dozen years "has been severely underpriced," and offering that "[u]nderpriced risk eventually
leads to periods of stiff and bitter market corrections.").
83. See, e.g., J. Michael Murphy, Efficient Markets, Index Funds, Illusion and Reality, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., FALL 1977, AT 5 (finding no real stable relationship between risk and return);
Robert A. Haugen & A. James Heins, Risk and the Rate of Return on Financial Assets: Some Old Wine
in New Bottles, 10 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 775 (1975) (citing results that did not support the
conventional notion that risk generates a special reward).
84. Cunningham, supra note 69, at 550
85. See Kaletsky, supra note 82 (arguing that "it is time for a revolution in economic thought" that
includes more than the current discredited models).
86. See discussion supra Part II.
87. Cunningham, supra note 69, at 571.
88. Id.
89. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 214.
90. Cunningham, supra note 69, at 572.
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August 2007 collapse of two Bear Steams hedge funds exposed to the
subprime mortgage market seems like a rather miniscule piece of news in
relation to the effects that followed. 9' A modem risk management platform
beholden to this linearity and proportionality constraint will necessarily fail
to adequately explain risk. 92  While many have offered newer, fresher
approaches to measuring risk, the important lesson for the prudent risk
manager today is that the problem is not understood simply.9 As market
participants navigate the choppy seas that risk brings, linear thought, policy
and practice and all of its creations are not a reliable lighthouse.94
Beyond a rethinking of the proxy that is used as a "risk-free" input in
most financial models and a reexamination of the effectiveness of those
models, the current crisis highlights the fact that risk in a financial market
cannot be understood with mathematical precision. Following the
spectacular blowup of LTCM a decade ago, Wall Street professed to
understand that trying to quantify risk absolutely is a fool's game. 95 Yet, in
the years following LTCM, Wall Street only increased its infatuation with
financial modeling.96 Among other things, the Credit Crisis illustrates the
failure of market players to learn the lessons of LTCM. In fact, recent
events once again uncovered a fundamental misunderstanding by many
market players of their own liquidity risks, the limitations of linearity and
the risk that models would come under increasing stress as markets became
turbulent and correlations of assets tended to increase (toward one).97 A
brief description of each of these misunderstandings-in the LTCM context
and today-and the ramifications follows.
91. See discussion supra pp. 272-74.
92. See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street, WIRED
MAG., Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wpquant (arguing that another
linear formula, the Gaussian Copula, on which much of the recent mortgage debacle was based, was
flawed because it "made no allowance for unpredictability" and "assumed that correlation was a
constant rather than something mercurial.").
93. Cunningham, supra note 69, at 608.
94. Cf. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 79, at 76 (quoting a currency trader as referring to Value at Risk
models as a "lighthouse for the soon-to-be-shipwrecked.").
95. See Lowenstein, supra note 20, at BUI ("In the wake of Long-Term Capital's failure, Wall
Street professed to have learned that even models designed by 'geniuses' were subject to error and to
the uncertainties that inevitably afflict human forecasts."). See also MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra
note 41, at 21 (observing that "[p]atterns are the fool's gold of financial markets."); Danielson, infra
note 144.
96. See Benoit Mandelbrot & Nassim Nicholas Taleb, How the Finance Gurus Get Risk All
Wrong, FORTUNE, July 11, 2005, at 100 (complaining that "[diespite increasing empirical evidence that
concentration and jumps better characterize market reality, the reliance on the random walk, the bell-
shaped curve, and their spawn of alphas and betas is accelerating, widening a tragic gap between reality
and the standard tools of financial measurement.").
97. See, e.g. Paul De Grauwe, The Hard Task of Pricing Liquidity Risk, RGE MONITOR, Dec. 17,
2007 (asserting that "[d]uring the last five years prior to August 2007, the market systematically
underestimated liquidity risk and therefore systematically put the liquidity risk premium too low.").
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C. THE FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Long-Term Capital Management was founded in 1994 by John
Meriwether, a celebrated bond trader who had left Salomon Brothers after a
highly publicized bond scandal in 1991.98 Meriwether assembled a "dream
team" of traders and academics in an attempt to create a fund that would
profit from the combination of the academics' quantitative models and the
traders' market judgment and execution capabilities. 99  Sophisticated
investors, including many large investment banks, enamored by the track
record that Meriwether and his bunch had compiled in their time at
Salomon Brothers, 100 invested $1.25 billion at inception. The firm was
charging annual fees of 2 percent of capital under management plus 25
percent of profits, well beyond the 1 percent and 20 percent that were the
standard in the hedge fund industry. m For three years, Meriwether and his
band made breathtaking profits, seducing all of Wall Street.102 In 1997, for
example, LTCM made a profit of $2.1 billion-besting firms like
McDonald's, Nike, Disney, American Express, and Merrill Lynch.10 3
98. In April 1991, Salomon's head of the government bond desk, Paul Mozer submitted a false bid
in excess of the firm's limits in a Treasury Department auction in an attempt to "corner" the market.
Mozer made Meriwether aware of his transgression and it was subsequently reported up the chain at
Salomon. After the Federal Reserve Bank learned that it had not been adequately informed of the
incident, the Chief Executive Officer John Gutfreund and the President Thomas W. Strauss were forced
to resign and Warren Buffett took over as Chairman. Meriwether was fined $50,000 by the SEC and
resigned from the firm shortly thereafter. See generally, Leah Nathans Spiro, Dream Team, BUSINESS
WEEK, Aug. 29, 1994, at 50 (summarizing the incident and its ramifications). See also LOWENSTEIN,
supra note 79, at 19-22 (recounting the Mozer affair and its effects on Salomon Brothers and
Meriwether).
99. Among others, the LTCM team included Meriwether, former vice-chairman of the Federal
Reserve David Mullins and the Nobel Prize winners Myron Scholes and Robert Merton. Eighty
investors, including Merrill Lynch CEO David Komansky and Bear Stearns President James Cayne,
invested a minimum of $10 million apiece to fund the venture.
100. The Salomon culture and Meriwether's bond-arbitrage group were described in vivid detail in
Michael Lewis' best-selling Wall Street classic LIAR'S POKER (Penguin Books, 1990).
101. See e.g., Carol Loomis, A House Built on Sand: John Meriwether's One Mighty Long-Term
Capital Has All But Crumbled. So Why Did Warren Buffett Offer to Buy It?, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998,
at 110 (characterizing the LTCM fee as "unusually steep"). David Ingram, Book Links,
CONTINGENCIES, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 48 (noting that the fee structure was in contrast to the 1 percent and
20 percent that had been the standard for 20 years).
102. See Amy Feldman, Investment Titans Fall, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, September 28, 1998, at 2
(describing the investors in LTCM as "a who's who list of high finance."). Based on returns derived
from the Wall Street Journal, for example, Philippe Jorion reports after-fees returns in excess of 40
percent for both 1995 and 1996. See JORION, supra note 32, at n.10. See also, Walter H. Weiner,
Recent Market Events and the Foundation for Global Market Crises: The Experience of Republic
National Bank, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. TAX L. F. 17, 20 (reporting LTCM earnings on capital of 20
percent, 43 percent, 41 percent and 17 percent for each of 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively).
See also Loomis, supra note 101 (reporting similar profit results).
103. See Paul Monk, Address at the Australian Tax Office Conference, Meriwether and Strange
Weather: Intelligence, Risk Management and Critical Thinking (Feb. 10, 2004).
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LTCM was primarily engaged in a strategy known as "market-neutral
arbitrage."' 1 4 Specifically, LTCM was heavily involved in fixed income
convergence trading-purchasing bonds that it considered undervalued and
selling bonds that it considered overvalued.'0 5 Compare, for instance, an
on-the-run 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yielding 4 percent and an off-the-
run 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yielding 4.02 percent. 10 6 Because the off-
the-run security is usually less frequently traded, it typically trades at a
slightly less expensive price and, therefore, offers a slightly higher yield.
0 7
The two bonds, however, must converge to the same value (except for a de
minimis time value of money effect) barring a market disruption. An
aggressive trader might go short the on-the-run version of the bond and
long the off-the-run series in anticipation of the credit spread between the
two bonds narrowing. Because these traders bet on miniscule movements
in bond spreads, they had "to put a lot of money on a position to make any
substantial profits. LTCM traders, however, were comfortable doing
this-largely with borrowed money-because they believed that their
quantitative models were superior to anything that the world had ever seen.
In the words of one of the LTCM traders, "these models enable us to
pursue a large position without a severe concern that our strategies are very
exposed to interest rates or yield-curve changes."' 1 9 One LTCM principal
described these activities as "earning a tiny spread on each of thousands of
trades, as if it were vacuuming up nickels that others couldn't see."" 0
Critics, by contrast, have likened the strategy to "picking up nickels in front
104. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 40 (1999).
105. See Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Financial Servs.,
105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Operations] (statement of William McDonough,
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (describing the strategy of LTCM as using "complex
mathematical formulas to identify temporary price discrepancies between different interest rates."); see
also Spiro, supra note 98 (commenting that LTCM "pioneered the art of computer-assisted bond
trading" and describing the LTCM strategy as using "computer-generated models to predict tiny but
enormously lucrative discrepancies in bond prices.").
106. An "on-the-mun" series of bonds includes the most recently issued bond with a particular
maturity. The "off-the-run" series, by contrast, is the former on-the-run series, becoming "off-the-run"
once a newer series of the same maturity is issued. Because on-the-run bonds are typically the most
liquid, they tend to yield less than their off-the-run counterparts.
107. See generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 79, at 43-44 (describing the phenomenon of the
spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries and LTCM's resulting trading strategy).
108. Spiro, supra note 98. See also Lee Berton, Collapse of LTCM a 'Must Read'for Profession,
15 ACCT. TODAY, April 2, 2001, at 9, 10 (commenting that LTCM required "huge amounts of money to
make a very small profit.").
109. This quotation is attributed to Lawrence E. Hilibrand, a LTCM trader. See Spiro, supra note
98. But cf NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SwAN 281 (2006) (commenting that "[t]he ideas of
portfolio theory inspired the risk management of possible outcomes-thanks to sophisticated
,calculations.' They managed to enlarge the ludicrous fallacy to industrial proportions.").
110. See ALEX BURNS, AUSTRALIAN FORESIGHT INSTITUTE, APOCALYPSE ROULETTE: THE FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10 (2002) (quoting Myron Scholes).
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of a steamroller.""'
While this type of hubris made LTCM ripe for a fall, it was the
extraordinary events of August 1998 in the global markets that tripped
them.'12  That month, the Russian government defaulted on its bonds,
triggering a market meltdown.'1 3  Following the announcement by the
Russian government of a debt moratorium, investors began a "flight to
quality," seeking superior credit quality and higher liquidity."4 As a result,
LTCM, one of the biggest traders in these bonds, was left with no
buyers. 115  To make matters worse, despite the LTCM models that
suggested independent price changes across their portfolio of assets, credit
spreads widened in almost all of the markets around the world, resulting in
major losses for LTCM and other similarly positioned market
participants. 16  The portfolio diversification principles at the heart of
Modem Portfolio Theory were the foundation for LTCM's models. The
theory, well known to the academic giants at LTCM, suggests that
diversification reduces the variability of a portfolio such that the benefit
from risk diversification makes it worthwhile for investors to allocate funds
to assets which-at first sight-offer inferior expected returns. 17 Yet, as
LTCM can attest, the benefits of such an allocation, erode at precisely the
time that the diversification benefits are needed most, during turbulent
market conditions."
18
111. See generally, Jefferson Duarte, Francis A. Longstaff & Fan Yu, Risk and Return in Fixed
Income Arbitrage: Nickels in Front of a Steamroller?, 20 REv. FIN. STUD. 769 (2007).
112. Hedge Fund Operations, supra note 105.
113. See Regimes in a Fix: Adjustable Exchange Rates and Free Capital Flows Do Not Mix, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at 18 (noting that the Russian government caused the default through a
combination of actions).
114. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOuNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK, 41 (1999):
The market had been volatile for several months, but the announcement by the Russian government that
it was rescheduling payments on some of its debt obligations and imposing a moratorium on payments
by Russian banks on certain obligations sent global markets into a tailspin. The result of the Russian
default was a dramatic increase in credit spreads and decrease in liquidity. Investors responded with a
"flight to quality" and liquidity.
115. See Weiner, supra note 102, at 21 (noting that LTCM's "downward spiral became a
whirlwind" as it reported a 45 percent loss in the month of August 1998).
116. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Managementl4 (1999) (noting that "LTCM then faced severe market
liquidity problems when its investments began losing value and the fund attempted to unwind some of
its positions.").
117. Rachel Campbell, Kees Koedijk, Catherine S. Forbes, & Paul Kofman, Diversification
Meltdown or the Impact of Fat Tails on Conditional Correlation? 2 (Monash Econometrics & Bus.
Stat., Working Paper No. 18/03, 2002).
118. See Larry Swedroe, Anatomy of a Crisis: Lessons Learned From Credit Crunch, INDEX
UNIVERSE, Oct. 19, 2008, http://www.indexuniverse.com/sections/features/4666-anatomy-of-a-crisis-
lessons-leamed.html (noting of investment banks, that "they forgot that even if assets have low
correlation, risky assets have a nasty tendency to have their correlations turn high at the wrong time.").
See also Hull, supra note 10, at I ("One of the lessons from past financial crises is that correlations
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The events of the summer of 1998, as described by the Bank of
International Settlements, sound eerily similar to the events that followed a
decade later, almost to the day.
[F]inancial markets around the globe experienced extraordinary strains,
raising apprehensions among market participants and policy makers of
an imminent implosion of the financial system. As investors appeared
to shy away from practically all types of risk, liquidity dried up in
financial markets in both industrial and emerging economies, and many
borrowers were unable to raise financing even at punitive rates. Prices
for all asset classes except the major industrial country government
bonds declined and issuance of new securities ground to a halt.l
9
By the end of September 1998, LTCM was teetering on the brink of
default. Fearful that the failure of LTCM might result in possible dire
consequences for the world's financial markets, the Federal Reserve
orchestrated a $3.6 billion infusion from a consortium of 14 leading U.S.
investment and commercial banks-all creditors who feared the effects of
the bankruptcy of a fund that owed $100 billion and what it would do to
their own finances. 120 In exchange the participants received 90 percent of
LTCM's equity-a piece that registered a handsome return over the months
following the bailout.
121
With such a memory only a decade old, it is difficult to understand
how so many market participants could have failed to see the liquidity and
correlation risks in the current cycle. I guess there is almost no limit to the
ability to ignore the lessons of the past.1
22
D. VALUE AT RISK
increase in stressed market conditions. Using standard value at risk techniques to estimate correlations
from past data and assuming that those correlations will apply in stressed markets is not appropriate.").
See also Peter Coy, Suzanne Woolley, Leah Nathans Spiro & William Glasgall, Failed Wizards of Wall
Street, Bus. WK., Sept. 21, 1998, at 114, 118 (commenting that "liquidity dried up across markets. It
was a worldwide phenomenon, so the geographic diversification employed by so many quant firms did
them not a whit of good.").
119. BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS, 69TH ANNUAL REPORT 82 (1999), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/ar99e.pdf.
120. For a rather lucid critique of the Fed's actions in response to the LTCM episode, see KEVIN
DOwD, Too BIG TO FAIL? LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE, (Cato
Inst. Briefing Papers No. 52, 1999).
121. See Michael Siconolfi, SEC Probes Hedge Fund's Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1998, at
CI (reporting that LTCM had a $400-million profit since the bailout).
122. See John Bogle, Six Lessons for Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A15. After making
this observation about investors, Mr. Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard Group of Mutual Funds, goes
on to quote the Roman orator Cato:
[T]here must be a vast fund of stupidity in human nature, or else men would not be
caught as they are, a thousand times over, by the same snares.., while they yet
remember their past misfortunes, they go on to court and encourage the causes to
what they were owing, and which will again produce them.
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One of the most celebrated creations of the modem financial society
(and a product of the normal distribution and a linear framework) has been
the Value at Risk ("VaR") approach to risk management. VaR's great
appeal, and its biggest selling point to those that are not quantitative
analysts, is that it expresses risk as a single number, a dollar figure, no
less.123  As a short examination of VaR's approach reveals, however, it
must be interpreted with a healthy skepticism; for it is as limited as the
modem approach to understanding risk from which it was bom.
1 24
In its most general form, VaR measures the potential loss in value of
a risky asset or portfolio over a specified period of time for a given
confidence interval. 125  For example, if the VaR of a portfolio is $25
million for a ten-trading-day, 99 percent confidence interval, the VaR
model establishes that there is a 1 percent chance that the portfolio's value
will drop by at least $25 million over any given ten-trading-day period.
While Value at Risk can be used to measure any firm's risk exposure, it is
most often used by hedge funds and commercial and investment banks to
capture the potential loss in value of a trading portfolio from adverse
market movements over the prescribed period. 126  By comparing this
123. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 26. See also Barr
Schachter, An Irreverent Guide to Value at Risk, FIN. ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 1997 (observing that
"VaR was developed to provide a single number which could encapsulate information about the risk in
a portfolio, could be calculated rapidly (by 4:15) and could communicate that information to
nontechnical senior managers."). Cf ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A
FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 221 (2007) [hereinafter DAMODARAN RISK] (observing that
although "many analysts like VaR because of its simplicity and intuitive appeal, relative to other risk
measures, its simplicity emanates from its narrow definition of risk.").
124. See DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 221 (observing that "the true VaR can be much
greater than the computed VaR if we consider political risk, liquidity risk and regulatory risks that are
not built into the VaR."). See also TALEB, supra note 109, at 24445 (describing the greatest limitation
of all models based on the normal distribution:
[l]f you are dealing with aggregates, where magnitudes do matter, such as income,
your wealth, return on a portfolio or book sales, then you will have a problem and
get the wrong distribution if you use the Gaussian, as it does not belong there. One
single number can disrupt all of your averages; one single loss can eradicate a
century of profits. You can no longer say "this is an exception."
Id.
125. In statistics, a confidence interval is used to indicate the reliability of an estimate. A confidence
level, by contrast, determines how likely the interval is to contain the parameter. Increasing the desired
confidence level has the effect of widening the confidence interval. A confidence interval can be used
to describe the reliability of the results of a particular survey. In a pre-election poll, for example, the
result might be that 44 percent of respondents intend to vote for a particular candidate. A 95 percent
confidence interval for the proportion in the whole population sharing that intention at the time of the
poll might be 41 percent to 47 percent. All other things being equal, a survey result with a small
confidence interval is more reliable than a result with a large confidence interval.
126. DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 201-02 (observing that, by comparing this measurement
to the available capital and cash reserves of the firm, the firm hopes to ensure that potential losses can
be absorbed without endangering the firm's very existence).
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measurement to the available capital and cash reserves, the firm hopes to
ensure that potential losses can be absorbed without putting the very
existence of the firm at risk. Even if VaR is correctly measured, however,
it can never fully answer that concern, for it does not even attempt to
measure the magnitude of the loss in the catastrophic range where the
confidence interval is breached.12 7 As one observer described it:
The fact that you are not likely to lose more than a certain amount 99
percent of the time tells you absolutely nothing about what could
happen the other 1 percent of the time. You could lose $51 million
instead of $50 million - no big deal. That happens two or three times a
year and no one blinks an eye. You could also lose billions and go out
of business. VaR has no way of measuring which it will be.
128
The first regulatory measures to evoke the VaR methodology were
initiated in 1980, when the SEC tied the capital requirements of financial
services firms to the losses that would be incurred with a 95 percent
confidence over a thirty-day interval, with historical returns used to
compute the potential losses.' 9 At the time, the Commission did not refer
to this measure as VaR, but "it was clear the SEC was requiring financial
service firms to embark on the process of estimating one-month 95 percent
VaRs and hold enough capital to cover the potential losses."'' 30 Following
a short period where individual institutions embarked on the development
of different measures of potential losses, and following a series of high-
profile losses associated with the use of derivatives and leverage, the
financial world took a significant step toward a more widely accepted and
comprehensive risk measure when J.P. Morgan provided public access to
its own approach in 1995.31
Over time, the financial services industry has accepted three basic
approaches to computing Value at Risk: the Variance-Covariance Model,'
32
127. See Nocera, supra note 123, at 29.
128. Id.
129. See Nocera, supra note 123, at 26 (noting that "as the use of derivatives was exploding, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ruled that finns had to include a quantitative disclosure of market
risks in their financial statements for the convenience of investors, and VaR became the main tool for
doing so.").
130. DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 203. See also Nocera, supra note 123, at 46
(commenting that [r]ather than doing anything to limit the growth of derivatives, the [SEC] concluded
that disclosure, via VaR, was sufficient.").
131. In October 1994, J.P. Morgan, under the name RiskMetrics, made the variances in and co-
variances across asset classes freely available to the public. This release, coupled with the RiskMetrics
Technical Document, allowed market participants to freely calculate VaR for a given portfolio. See
JORION, supra note 32, at 21 (commenting that the release of RiskMetrics "immediately engaged the
industry and spurred academic research into risk management."). See also Nocera, supra note 123, at
33 (discussing the irony of the fact that RiskMetrics was ultimately spun off from JP Morgan during the
very same month that LTCM "blew up").
132. The Variance-Covariance Model approach to VaR derives a probability distribution of
potential values to discern the probability that the value of an asset or portfolio will drop below a
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the Historical Simulation Model133  and the Monte Carlo Simulation
Model. 134 Each of the three approaches to VaR has advantages, but comes
"with baggage."'' 35  The variance-covariance approach, for example,
requires strong assumptions about the return distributions of the assets in
the model. The historical simulation model, on the other hand, assumes
that the data of the past is an accurate sample of the risks going forward.
36
Finally, the Monte Carlo simulation, while certainly more robust than the
historical model, remains more difficult from a computational
standpoint.
37
While VaR has become a favorite tool of risk managers over the past
specified value during a particular period of time. This approach to VaR involves a multi-step process
to (i) understand and restate assets as simpler and more standardized underlying instruments, (ii)
determine the variance and covariance of each of the underlying instruments in the appropriate
weighting and (iii) calculate the Value at Risk for the portfolio using the weights, variances and
covariances from the earlier steps. While this approach generally has the advantage of simplicity, a
modeler often runs into difficulties in determining the probability distributions. See generally
DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 204-10 (observing that, despite recent improvements, the
weakness of the approach is found in the estimation process where the model can suffer from incorrect
assumptions, input errors and the fact that values and their relationships change over time).
133. The Historical Simulation approach estimates the VaR of a portfolio by creating a hypothetical
time series of returns for the portfolio based upon the historical attributes of the underlying positions.
While this approach makes no distributional assumptions it suffers from over-reliance on the notion that
history will repeat itself. See JORUON, supra note 32, at 262-65 (describing the advantages and
drawbacks of the Historical Simulation approach). See also DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 210-
14 (also observing that the historical version of VaR suffers from the fact that trends in the data are
ignored because each data point is weighed equally and the model is not particularly good at dealing
with new risks that are introduced to assets).
134. The Monte Carlo model of VaR identifies market risks and converts individual assets into
positions in standardized instruments in a manner similar to the Variance-Covariance approach. The
modeler then specifies (i) probability distributions for each of the market risk factors and (ii) their co-
movements before running a simulation. While the Monte Carlo approach represents a certain freedom
from the binds of the linear approach, as Professor Damodaran observes, it suffers from the fact that it
is only "as good as the probability distribution for the inputs that is fed into it." See DAMODARAN RISK,
supra note 123, at 214-17. For an in-depth discussion of the Monte Carlo VaR approach, see Jo iON,
supra note 32, at 307-29.
135. DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 211.
136. Perhaps the greatest critique of this approach is found in former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan's mea culpa before Congress in 2008:
The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year
because the data inputted into the risk management models generally covered only
the past two decades, a period of euphoria. Had instead the models been fitted more
appropriately to historic periods of stress, capital requirements would have been
much higher and the financial world would be in far better shape today, in my
judgment.
See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan). See also
Nocera, supra note 123, at 29 (observing that "people tend not to be able to anticipate a future they have
never personally experienced.").
137. See generally, JORION, supra note 32, at 266-67 (calling Monte Carlo analysis the "most
powerful method" to compute VaR while conceding that it requires computational time and expense
and is limited by the fact that the inputs "could be wrong"). See also, DAMODARAN RISK, supra note
123, at 19 et seq. (describing some of the limitations of each of the approaches to VaR).
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decade, there is reason to be skeptical of both its accuracy as a risk
management tool and its use in decision making. 38 As markets become
less predictable and previously observed correlations break down, so too do
the models. 139 First, the quantitative inputs called for by the VaR model-
length of investment horizon and confidence interval-are arbitrary
choices. As such, VaR itself is not an objective or scientific measure of the
exposure to market risk, but instead a subjective game-type measure.
40
The most basic Variance-Covariance VaR approach to risk is deeply rooted
in variance-based linear statistics and probability theory, whose application
to market risk estimation is founded on the assumption that markets are
Gaussian random walks-that returns in the market follow the normal
distribution. The problems and limitations with such an approach should
already be clear.'' As a creation of this linear orthodoxy, the VaR
methodology devotes insufficient attention to the truly extreme financial
events. 142  While the historical distribution approach allows for a model
beyond the normal distribution parameters, it is burdened by the troubling
assumption that the returns in the future will be well represented by those
gathered from the past.143 Finally, the Monte Carlo simulation avoids some
of the problems of the other two approaches, by relies in large measure, on
the portfolio attributes provided by the modeler. Simply put, the model is
of little use if those assumptions turn out to be incorrect.
The observations of one critic of the VaR approach are prescient for
all market participants and have application more broadly for all attempting
to manage risk. The critic suggests an approach that:
138. DAMODARAN RISK, supra note 123, at 218.
139. Peter Guest, Tail Events Dog Value at Risk Models, FIN. TIMES MANDATE, June 2008, http://
www.ftmandate.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1784/Tailevents dogvalue at risk-models.html.
140. Cornelis A. Los, Why VAR Fails: Long Memory and Extreme Events in Financial Markets,
ICFAI J. FIN. ECON., Sept. 2005, 19.
141. See Richard Hoppe, It's Time We Buried Value-at-Risk, RISK PROFESSIONAL, July/Aug. 1999,
at 14 (observing that the actual behavior of financial markets does not correspond to the assumptions
underlying the mathematical theory).
142. Los, supra note 140, at 19. For one of the most damning rebukes of VaR, see also Jorion,
supra note 32, at 552.
VAR has made us replace about 2500 years of market experience with a covariance
matrix that is still in its infancy... To me, VAR is charlatanism because it tries to
estimate something that is not scientifically possible to estimate, namely, the risks
of rare events. It gives people misleading precision that could lead to the buildup of
positions by hedgers. It lulls people to sleep.
Id. (quoting from a Derivatives Strategy interview ofNassim Taleb).
143. While I concede that those who fail to leam from the past are bound to repeat it, I always warn
my students that those who learn only from the past lack imagination. This warning holds true for all
models based on historical data. See Hoppe supra note 141, at 15 (criticizing the assumptions of VaR
that mean, variance, skew and kurtosis are taken to be stable through time as meaning that "one must
believe that market participants are incapable of learning from experience and have no expectations
about tomorrow to change in the light of yesterday's events."). See also, JORION, supra note 32, at 134
(conceding that even the "most powerful statistical techniques cannot make short histories reveal once-
in-a-lifetime events.").
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openly admit[s] that the problem as stated cannot be adequately
addressed with existing techniques instead of burying the knowledge
in a blizzard of technical obfuscation. The hardest thing for me to
learn in 20 years as a professor was to say 'I don't know' when I
didn't know. But that turns out to be the most truthful thing one can
say in many situations. I believe this is one such situation.
144
The broad acceptance of VaR as a risk tool might represents an
example of the toughest problem of all for market participants attempting
to vigilantly manage their risk. In the recent crisis, the false sense of
security provided by the VaR methodology might have served as a Trojan
horse, inviting more and more risk into the financial institutions that it
served.145 While these firms took great care to closely monitor the results
provided by the risk tools, they failed to adequately question the very
underpinnings of those widely accepted measures. Proponents of VaR like
to argue that, despite its shortcomings, it is better than what risk managers
had before. This is a troubling point of view--one soundly rejected by one
of VaR's loudest critics:
That's completely wrong. It's not better than what you had because
you are relying on something with false confidence and running larger
positions than you would have otherwise. You're worse off relying on
misleading information than not having any information at all. If you
give a pilot an altimeter that is sometimes defective, he will crash the
plane. Give him nothing, and he will look out the window.
Technology is only safe if it is flawless. 1
46
Even the most advanced VaR models suffer from the familiar
limitations of the linear approach, all are ill-equipped to anticipate the
outsized effects of that final one ounce straw on the camel's back.147As the
next section of this Article explains, that risk often rears its head when the
state of mind of market participants changes and liquidity suffers. Relying
on VaR or not, all managers in the current crisis would have done well to
have remembered our mantra: to beware of risk everywhere-especially
144. Hoppe, supra note 141, at 16. See also Jon Danielson, The Great Risk Myth, BUS. SPECTATOR,
Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Risky-behaviour-$pd2009OlO7N32
VA?OpenDocument&src=srch ("[t]here is a widely held belief that financial risk is easily measured-
that we can stick some sort of riskometer deep into the bowels of the financial system and get an
accurate measurement of the risk of complex financial instruments. Misguided belief that this
riskometer exists played a key role in getting the financial system into the mess it is in.").
145. See Robert Langreth, The Oracle of Doom, FORBES, Feb. 2, 2009, at 20, 20 (arguing that
"[f]aulty risk-control models from overconfident economists offered the illusion that we had everything
under control and that banks were profitable when they really weren't .... ").
146. JORION, supra note 32, at 552 (quoting from a Derivatives Strategy interview ofNassim Taleb).
Cf Philippe Jorion, In Defense of VAR, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, Apr. 1997, http://www.derivatives
strategy.conmagazine/archive/1997/0497fea2.asp (positing that "a wobbly speedometer is better than
nothing.").
147. See discussion, supra note 83.
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where you don't see it.
E. LIQUIDITY RISKS
Liquidity is generally defined as the ability of a financial firm to meet
its debt obligations without incurring unacceptably large losses.
48
Liquidity risk, therefore, is the risk to earnings or capital from an
institution's inability to meet its obligations when they come due without
accepting such a loss.' 49  Liquidity risk comes in two basic varieties. 5 °
Funding liquidity risk is the risk of a firm's inability to fund the positions
that it holds or to meet, when due, the cash and collateral demands of
transaction counterparties, other credit providers and investors without
materially affecting daily operations or overall financial condition.
51
Market liquidity risk refers to the firm's inability to liquidate positions in
various asset markets. 5 2  Ultimately, a problem with a firm's market
148. Jose A. Lopez, What is Liquidity Risk?, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic
Letter 1 (Oct. 24, 2008). Cf Maureen O'Hara, Liquidity and Financial Market Stability 1, (Nat'l Bank
of Beig. Working Paper No. 55, 2004) (observing that "[w]hile seemingly a simple concept, the exact
meaning of liquidity is far from apparent, and it is this definitional quandary that contributes to the
various disagreements over liquidity."); Anastasia Nesvetailova, The End of a Great Illusion: Credit
Crunch and Liquidity Meltdown 10, (DIIS Working Paper No. 2008/23, 2008) (noting that
"[e]verybody knows that liquidity is important, yet few would brave defining what it is, or how to
gauge it accurately.").
149. Lopez, supra note 148, at 1.
150. See JORION, supra note 32, at 23 (describing, generally, the two forms which he characterizes
as "funding liquidity risk" and asset liquidity risk").
151. Lopez, supra note 148, at 1. See also, JORION, supra note 32, at 23 (discussing funding
liquidity risk). See also, Timothy Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Keynote
Address at the 8th Annual Risk Convention and Exhibition, Global Association of Risk Professionals:
Liquidity and Financial Markets (Feb. 28, 2007) (describing funding liquidity as "the availability of
credit or the ease with which institutions can borrow or take on leverage."). In my experience, students
often confuse the notions of liquidity and solvency. One of the most colorful explanations of the
difference is offered below:
A liquidity crisis is when you write a check for more than the amount in your
checking account. You suddenly realize that you need to sell a big securities
position to cover it, but selling everything at once might only get you "fire sale"
prices. In this case, you need a loan for a few weeks to give you time to work out
of your securities position. Without the short-term "liquidity," the check might
bounce even though you really do have the assets to pay it off. In contrast, a
solvency crisis is when the only asset you have to cover that check is an IOU from
your Uncle Emie, who keeps promising "I'll pay you every dime as soon as I win it
back on the ponies."
See John P. Hussman, The Fed Can Provide Liquidity, But Not Solvency, HUSSMAN FUNDS, Mar. 17,
2008, http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc0803l7.htm.
152. See JORION, supra note 32, at 23 (discussing asset liquidity risk). See also Nathan Bryce,
Hedge Funds, Liquidity and Prime Brokers, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 479 (observing that
market liquidity is a measure of the degree of difficulty in exiting a given trading position without
affecting the security's market price).
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liquidity will impact its ability to manage and hedge market risks and to
satisfy any shortfall on the funding side.1"
Investors must take care to remember that liquidity varies over time
and across markets.15 4  The traditional cautious view of liquidity was
trumpeted by the economist Keynes more than seventy years ago:
Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social
than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the
part of investment institutions to concentrate their holdings of "liquid"
securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of
investment for the community as a whole.'
55
Keynes was weary of too much liquidity. To Keynes, the seamless
ability to buy and sell in the capital markets could result in investors
becoming fixated on the short-term-a destabilizing effect on markets.
This notion that liquidity begets instability has a long tradition in
economics. 156
Liquidity risk arises whenever an institution borrows short and lends
long. 157 In entering into such a position, a firm is becoming less liquid and,
in turn, its counterparty gains increased liquidity. In effect, borrowing
short means that the firm will require frequent votes of confidence from its
153. Andre Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives in the U.S. and
Europe, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 167-68. See also, Geithner, supra note 151 (describing
market liquidity as "the ease with which market participants can transact, or the ability of markets to
absorb large purchases or sales without much effect on prices.").
154. In fact, investors and their advisors would be wise to heed Professor Nesvetailova's warning
that"[a]ssets that are easy to sell when economic agents share a sense of optimism about their
profitability, liquidity and safety, often turn out to be unwanted and expensive bundles of 'illiquid' debt
when the sense of optimism evaporates. Hence 'liquidity' can evaporate literally overnight."
See Nesvetailova, supra note 148, at 10.
155. John M. Keynes, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 155
(1961).
156. See O'Hara, supra note 148, at 2-3 (tracing the history of "The Dark Side" of liquidity from
Keynes through Tobin, Summers and John Coffee). Most recently, Larry Summers echoed the
Keynesian view: "It does not follow that once an adequate level of liquidity has been attained, as must
have been the case in the stock market years ago, further increases in liquidity are stabilizing.
Indeed,. . . excessive liquidity actually encourages destabilizing speculation." See Lawrence H.
Summers & V.P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities
Transaction Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, (1989).
157. When the yield curve is upward-sloping, longer-maturity Treasuries pay higher rates than those
with shorter maturities. This is a typical property of interest rates and it is the main reason that financial
institutions are able to earn profits. Banks, for instance, hold assets (loans and securities) that tend to
have long maturities on average. Mortgages, for example, often have maturities of thirty years. On the
other hand, most bank liabilities are deposits with short maturities. As a result, the interest rates that
banks earn on their assets are typically a few percentage points above those that they owe on their
liabilities. The ability to take advantage of the yield curve's upward slope-to "borrow short and lend
long"-does not come without risks. Unanticipated changes in interest rates represent a potential danger
to both profitability and solvency that must be managed. See also Spiro, supra note 98 (noting that
"Long Term Capital is a hedge fund: it buys long and sells short using money raised from institutions
and well-heeled private investors.").
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lenders. The risk of this position arises from the fact that the assets (loan)
will generally have a longer maturity than the liabilities (deposits) for the
lender. 15 8  As a result, any "run on the bank" in which many depositors
simultaneously show up to withdraw funds can easily lead to default as the
institution struggles to gather enough funds to satisfy all of the withdrawals
in a prompt manner. 159 Likewise, a decrease in the market value of a firm's
investments or trading positions might require the firm to post additional
collateral for the benefit of a counterparty, causing a similar dilemma for
the firm. 160 This market psychology was at the heart of Keynes' cautious
view of liquidity and serves as the basis for Paul McCulley's warning that
"liquidity is not a pool of money, but rather a state of mind."
16'
In recent years, this state of mind has been spread more broadly than
has traditionally been the case. Largely as a result of financial innovation
and deregulation, liquidity providers encompass a greater diversity of
institutions--dubbed the "shadow banking system" by Mr. McCulley.
162
158. See Lopez, supra note 148, at 1 (observing that "[f]inancial firms are especially sensitive to
funding liquidity risk since debt maturity transformation (for example, funding longer-term loans or
asset purchases with shorter-term deposits or debt obligations) is one of their key business areas.").
159. See Congressional Oversight Panel, supra note 23, at 10 (observing that, in addition to
traditional bank runs, other types of creditors can weaken or destroy a financial institution and adding
that "for example, short-term lenders can refuse to roll over existing loans ... and market actors may
refuse to continue to deal with it.").
160. See Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Fed. Reserve System, Remarks at the Risk Minds
Conference, International Center for Business Information, Geneva, Switzerland: Assessing the
Potential for Instability in Financial Markets (Dec. 8, 2008) (observing that, in the recent credit crisis,
"[t]here was not sufficient understanding of the correlation between declines in collateral value and the
likelihood that collateral would need to be called upon.").
161. See Paul McCulley, A Reverse Minsky Journey, PIMCO INVESTMENT OUTLOOK, Oct. 2007,
http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/FF/2007/GCBF+October+2007.htm
arguing that liquidity is a function of "[t]he willingness of investors to underwrite risk and uncertainty
with borrowed money and the willingness of savers to lend money to investors who want to underwrite
risk and uncertainty with borrowed money."). See also, Geithner, supra note 151 (observing that
"liquidity is like confidence. And, like confidence, liquidity plays a critical role both in establishing the
conditions than [sic] can lead to a financial shock, and in determining whether that shock becomes
acute, threatening broader damage to the functioning of financial and credit markets."). In the early
stages of the current crisis, Citigoup's then-CEO ruffled some feathers when he compared the liquidity
in the market to a game of musical chairs: "When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing."
See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is 'Still Dancing' to the Beat of the Buy-
out Boom, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at 1. For my money, Mr. Prince's statement shows great insight
and highlights a serious dilemma of the past cycle. Market participants could not resist the elixir of
short term profits even when they might have understood that their actions could eventually amount to
collecting nickels in front of a steamroller.
162. For a far more eloquent and colorful description, see Bill Gross, The Shadow Knows, PIMCO
INVESTMENT OUTLOOK, Dec. 2007, http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/
IO/2007/10+December.htm (commenting: "it is certainly true that this shadow system with its
derivatives circling the globe has democratized credit. And as the benefits of cheaper financing became
available to the many, as opposed to the few, placating and calming waves of higher productivity and
widespread diversification led to accelerating economic growth, incomes, and corporate profits. Yet, as
is humanity's wont, we overdid a good thing and the subprime skim milk has soured."). See also
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Some have trumpeted the benefits of this ongoing trend toward
"disintermediation"--enabling companies to access the ultimate sources of
funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or financial
intermediaries. 163 The fact that large pools of liquidity have been outside
the confines of the traditional banking sector, however, has frustrated the
efforts of federal regulators to recognize and respond to liquidity
episodes. 164  In fact, this simple structural phenomenon creates profound
complications for today's regulators in attempting to manage a "run on the
bank." While the traditional bank has access to the Federal Reserve as the
lender of last resort and the bank's depositors sleep comfortably under the
blanket of the FDIC insurance guaranteeing the return of their capital,
today's pools of shadow banking liquidity share no such protections.
Absent an explicit transmission mechanism for government support, the
pressure to withdraw intensifies as individual depositors redeem now and
ask questions later.
165
F. THE FALL OF BEAR STEARNS
In the current cycle, there might be no greater example of the
stampeding effects of a changing state of mind than the case of the fall of
Bear Steams. On March 12, 2008, Bear Steams & Co. President and Chief
Executive Officer Alan Schwartz found himself on CNBC assuring the
investing public that Bear Steams was not aware of any imminent threat to
its liquidity. 66 The very next day, Bear Steams sought emergency funding
Congressional Oversight Panel, supra note 23, at 2 (observing that "deregulation and the growth of
unregulated, parallel shadow markets were accompanied by the nearly unrestricted marketing of
increasingly complex consumer financial products that multiplied risk at every stratum of the economy,
from the family level to the global level.").
163. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 200 (2008) (asserting that such
disintermediation will make a chain of bank failures less critical than in the past).
164. See Martin Fedstein, Full Statement for the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee:
The Economic Stimulus and Sustained Economic Growth, (Jan. 7, 2009) (observing that "[b]ecause of
the dysfunctional credit markets and the collapse of housing demand, monetary policy has had no
traction in its attempt to lift the economy."). For a reasonably straightforward description of the
"shadow banking system" that developed in the United States in recent years, see KRUGMAN, supra
note 35, at 158 et seq.
165. Timothy Geithner, the President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank articulated the risks of
the shadow banking system in a recent speech:
The scale of the long-term risky and relatively illiquid assets financed by very
short-term liabilities made many of the vehicles and institutions in this parallel
financial system vulnerable to a classic type of run, but without the protections such
as deposit insurance that the banking system has in place to reduce such risks.
See Timothy F. Geithner, Remarks at The Economic Club of New York: Reducing Systemic
Risk in a Dynamic Financial System (June 9, 2008).
166. Andrew Fisher, Bear Stearns CEO: No Liquidity Crisis For Firm, CNBC, March 14, 2008,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/23590249 (quoting Schwartz as saying "[wie finished the year, and we
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from the Federal Reserve. 167  Less than one month later, Mr. Schwartz
offered the following testimony to the United States Senate Banking
Committee following the collapse of his company.
Due to the stressed condition of the credit market as a whole and the
unprecedented speed at which rumors and speculation travel and echo
through the modem financial media environment, the rumors and
speculation became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because of the rumors
and conjecture, customers, counterparties and lenders began exercising
caution in their dealings with us-and during the latter part of the week
outright refused to do business with Bear Steams. Even if these
counterparties and institutional investors believed-as we did-that we
were stable, it appears that these parties were faced with the dilemma
that if the rumors proved true, they could be in the difficult position of
having to explain to their clients and others why they continued to do
business with Bear Steams ... There was, simply put, a run on the
bank. 1
68
Even after his firm was subsumed by the storm of a classic liquidity
squeeze, Mr. Schwartz showed his basic misunderstanding of liquidity risk
when he added, "I want to emphasize that the impetus for the run on Bear
Steams was in the first instance the result of a lack of confidence, not a
lack of capital or liquidity."1 69 Are not the two the same?
Mr. Schwartz was the classic product of the linear environment. He
reported that we had $17 billion of cash sitting at the bank's parent company as a liquidity cushion. As
the year has gone on, that liquidity cushion has been virtually unchanged."). That same day, Schwartz
is also quoted as saying "[o]ur liquidity and balance sheet are strong... [w]e don't see any pressure on
our liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis." See Why Wall Street Could Go To Jail, FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.com/gaileries/2008/fortune/0812/gallery.parloff-quotes.fortune/4.html (last visited
Jan. 6, 2009).
167. See BAMBER & SPENCER, infra note 168, at 119-28 (describing the events of March 14, 2008,
and the reaction within Bear Steams).
168. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008)
[hereinafter Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets] (statement of Alan Schwartz, President and C.E.O of
The Bear Steams Companies, Inc). See also BILL BAMBER & ANDREW SPENCER, BEAR TRAP: THE
FALL OF BEAR STEARNS AND THE PANIC OF 2008 at 63 (2008) ( observing that "[t]he rumors, because
of the very fact that they had been uttered, became truths."). Cf. KRUGMAN, supra note 35, at 154,
describing, more generally, the cycle of a bank run:
Every once in a while, however, things would go spectacularly wrong. There
would be a rumor-maybe true, maybe false-that a bank's investments had gone
bad, that it no longer had enough assets to repay its depositors. The rumor would
cause a rush by depositors to get their money out before it is all gone-what we call
a 'run on the bank.' And often such a run would break the bank even if the original
rumor was false ... Since runs based even on false rumors could break healthy
institutions, bank runs became self-fulfilling prophecies: a bank might collapse, not
because there was a rumor about its investments having gone bad, but simply
because there was a rumor that it was about to suffer a run.
169. Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 168.
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grew up in an investment bank in the modem financial era, where the
development of modem financial theories led many to believe that risks
could be understood absolutely.170 He earned his stripes in an environment
where risk taking was rewarded handsomely.' 71 Sure, Bear had had some
bumps in the road earlier in the year, but in the minds of many, it had
survived those episodes and would live to fight another day. Mr.
Schwartz, when he made his statements to the television audience, was no
doubt quite familiar with what his firm's VaR models suggested for Bear's
potential loss-with a 99 percent confidence interval, no less. What Mr.
Schwartz did not know, was never trained or encouraged to ask and
probably had not even entertained, was that the entire basis for his firm's
model (and the large majority of all models in today's financial system)
was flawed and therefore doomed to failure-not because of any
mathematical error, but because risk in a financial market cannot be known
with mathematical precision and trying to quantify it absolutely is a fool's
game. 73 As a changing state of mind beset the market that Spring, Bear
Steams asked for a vote of confidence from its lenders as it had done very
night for years. On that one night in March, the unthinkable happened-
the lenders voted "no confidence" and Bear Steams became the financial
markets' latest victim-picking up nickels in front of a steamroller.
Certainly, Mr. Schwartz was not alone in his misunderstanding. The
gathering forces of the liquidity squeeze also remained fairly invisible to
the regulators throughout Bear's demise. In fact, earlier in the very week
of Bear's failure, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox-armed with the results
of some very similar calculations, no doubt-ensured investors that his
regulatory agency was comfortable with the capital cushions at the nation's
five largest investment banks (including Bear Steams).
174
170. See e.g., TALEB, supra note 109, at 277-78 (noting that Gaussian-trained finance professors
have taken over the business schools in the United States, "producing close to a hundred thousand
students a year... all brainwashed by a phony portfolio theory."). Mr. Schwartz joined Bear Steams in
1976 and became the Executive Vice President and Head of the Investment Banking Division in 1985.
He rose to Co-President and Co-Chief Operating Officer in 2001 and became the sole President and
Chief Operating Officer in 2007. He became the Chief Executive Officer on Jan. 8, 2008. Id.
171. See, e.g., Ben Levisohn, Bear Stearns Big Shots Reaped Big Paydays, Bus. WK., Mar. 19,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23711023/ (noting that Schwartz took home $141-million in total
compensation during the five years from 2002 through 2006).
172. See BAMBER & SPENCER, supra note 168, at 63 (commenting that while the firm was still
reeling from earlier events, "all signs within the firm pointed towards a full recovery."). See also
Burrough, supra note 20 (noting that Bear Steams CFO, Sam Molinaro, driving home on the evening of
March 10, "thought he could spot the first rays of daylight at the end of nine solid months of nonstop
crisis.").
173. See discussion, supra note 95.
174. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 166. In addition, Mr. Schwartz's testimony highlights the fact that
the regulator's requirements remain ineffective to stem off such a crisis. As Mr. Schwartz points out,
"Bear Steams had a capital cushion well above what was required to meet regulatory standards." Id.
See also Kate Kelly, Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Steams, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008.
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After the demise of Bear, the attention of the financial community
quickly turned to the fates of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. In fact,
by the time the liquidity episode had run its course and the curtain came
down on 2008, all five of the investment banks cited by Mr. Cox were
gone 175 a sobering lesson in liquidity risk indeed.1
76
G. AUCTION RATE SECURITIES
Auction rate securities ("ARS") offer another example of a recent
liquidity episode. Until recently, the market for auction rate securities was
a thriving, little-known comer of the United States capital markets.
177
Auction rate securities are long-term securities-either debt that matures in
30 or 40 years or perpetual preferred stock-with interest rates that vary
periodically based on an auction process. 178 ARS are often marketed and
sold by a single dealer with the only resale market being through a
successful auction. 179  During the second week of February 2008, the
auctions at which these interest rates are established experienced a wave of
failures, causing the Wall Street Journal to declare the market "virtually
collapsed."' 180 The failures resulted in the filing of numerous lawsuits by
at Al (noting that SEC staffers "appeared comfortable" with Bear Steams' position in the days and
weeks leading up to its collapse).
175. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 14,
2008. See Voluntary Petition, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2008).
Merrill Lynch merged with Bank of America and Goldman Sachs & Co. and Morgan Stanley became
bank holding companies in order to access the Fed's Discount Window.
176. And a stunning rebuke of the Security and Exchange Commission's own understanding of
liquidity risk!
177. See Adrian D'Silva, Haley Gregg, & David Marshall, Explaining the Decline in the Auction
Rate Securities Market, The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter, (Nov. 2008).
178. Id. The rates paid on ARS are determined by market participants through auctions that are
typically held at 7, 28, 35 and 49 day intervals, with some securities resetting through daily auctions.
See LEE, infra note 179, at 5. See John J. McConnell & Alessio Saretto, Auction Failures and the
Market for Auction Rate Securities 5, (Working Paper, 2008). See also D'Silva, et al., supra note 177,
at I (observing that interest rate resets are typically "at intervals of one, four, five or seven weeks,
although other reset intervals are possible.").
179. See STEPHANIE LEE, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, AUCTION-RATE SECURITIES: BIDDER'S
REMORSE? 1 (2008) (noting that there is rarely a resale market outside of the auction).
180. James B. Stewart, The Troubles of Auction Rate Preferred Shares, SMARTMONEY, Feb. 26,
2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/investing/stocks/the-troubles-of-auction-rate-preferred-shares-2612/
(lamenting that "[w]hat was a ready source of cash is now essentially frozen."); See also Liz
Rappaport & Craig Karmin, Train Pulls Out on New Corner of Debt Market: Auction-Rate Securities
Failing to Draw Bidders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at Cl. See also Auctions Fail on Fear of Fear
Itself Dow JONES CAPITAL MARKETS REP., Feb. 12, 2008 (observing that "[t]he failure of a string of
short-term funding auctions this week is a reminder that not only is the credit crunch not over -it's
taken a further step into the realm of the irrational"). See also, Michael McDonald, Auction Bond
Failures Near 70%; No Sign of Abating, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601103&refer=news&sid=aQWkrM3N6WdA (stating that "[a]uction-rate bond
failures show no signs of abating after investors abandoned the market for variable-rate municipal
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investors claiming that the nature and the risks of these securities were
misrepresented. Various investigations by the SEC and several state
attorneys general were announced, promising to examine the activities of
several major underwriters of ARS securities.'
Auction rate securities were first offered in the United States in the
early 1980s as an alternative for entities looking to raise long-term
funding. i 12  The auction rate market developed and expanded throughout
the 1990s and into the early part of this decade.18 3  By the end of 2005,
there were over $250 billion of these securities outstanding, 184 with the
market exceeding $330 billion by 2008.185 ARS seemed to offer the best of
both worlds. It was hoped that the product could provide the various
issuers with a cheaper funding source than the traditional long-term bond.
ARS were designed to behave like a long-term bond for the issuer but
resemble a short-term security, such as commercial paper, for the
investor. When the auctions functioned as they were designed, the best
of both worlds was, indeed, achieved, as the ARS offered a degree of
liquidity comparable to very short-term assets for the investor and cost less
than more traditional long-term funding for the issuer.' 87
securities."). See also Julie Creswell and Vikas Bajaj, Municipalities Feel Pinch as Another Debt
Market Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at CI (noting that more than 1,000 auctions failed in a
three-day period in February 2008).
181. For a comprehensive listing of the litigation and regulatory responses to the auction rate
failures, see LEE, supra note 179, at 18-19.
182. According to McConnell & Saretto, supra note 178, the first ARS bond was issued in 1985 by
Warrick County (Indiana) to finance the Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company and the number of
ARS issuances "ebbed and flowed as capital market activity underwent cycles of expansion and
contraction" thereafter. See also Floyd Norris, Auctions Yield Chaos for Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 20,
2008, at Cl (noting that the market for auction rate securities was invented by Ronald Gallatin, an
investment banker at Lehman Brothers). See also LEE, supra note 179, at 9 (tracing the roots of the
ARS market all the way back to the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s).
183. See LEE supra note 179, at 5 (noting that the market grew to include issuers as varied as
municipalities, closed-end mutual funds, student loan lenders and collateralized debt obligations
("CDOs").
184. See MERRILL LYNCH GLOBAL MARKETS & INVESTMENT BANKING GROUP, DESCRIPTION OF
MERRILL LYNCH'S AUCTION RATE SECURITIES PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 3, http://www.ml.com/
media/70501 .pdf (last visited January 6, 2008). Cf Ann Monroe, Money Market Preferred Finds Favor
with Debt Issuers Since '84 Introduction, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1985, at I (commenting that the Dutch
Auction "only works because investors believe it will work" and adding that "anything that shook
investor confidence ... could make the concept unworkable and jeopardize price stability").
185. Gretchen Morgenson, As Good as Cash, Until It's Not, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at I (sizing
the market at $330 billion). See also Stewart, supra note 180, (estimating the market to be $330
billion).
186. D'Silva, et al., supra note 177, at 1. As Doherty, infra note 190, establishes, based on data
available at the beginning of 2008, the ARS market was comprised of four main types of issuers.
Municipalities has $165 billion of ARS outstanding while closed end mutual funds, student loan trusts
and collateralized debt obligations had $63 billion, $85 billion and $20 billion, respectively.
187. D'Silva, et al., supra note 177, at 1. See also A Dutch Auction Security Debut, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1988, at Dl 6 (noting that "[a]ccording to Goldman Sachs, the new concept offers municipal
issuers short-term rates on long-term debt issues."). See, e.g. DOUGLAS SKARR, CA DEBT INV.
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The interest rate on ARS is set through a Dutch Auction process
where existing ARS holders wishing to sell supply securities to the auction.
Potential purchasers (including existing holders wishing to reinvest) bid for
securities by specifying both the quantity of securities that they wish to buy
and the minimum interest rate that they will accept. In the typical auction,
each bid and order size is ranked from lowest to highest based on the
minimum bid rate. The entire supply of securities is then allocated to those
bidders who specified a minimum acceptable interest rate at or below the
lowest rate that clears the market (the "clearing rate").188  Successful
bidders all receive the clearing rate, regardless of the specific rate of their
bid.189  Until the recent troubles, a successful auction was thought to
provide a high degree of liquidity for investors, since the investors could
choose to redeem their ARS holdings at par at the next scheduled
auction.1 90 As such, investors viewed these instruments mainly as a vehicle
to park short-term cash in exchange for a return a little better than that
offered by a traditional money market. 191 In fact, one of the key drivers of
the market's growth was the investors' belief that these instruments
represented the equivalent of a money market fund, 92 prompting one
famous analyst to quip:
[flor a while they did what they were designed to do-allowing towns
and cities to borrow money at slightly lower rates and 'cash' investors
to earn slightly higher ones-and this led Wall Street to declare them
safe. Alas, these days many auction rate securities can't be sold for
love or money, which has left firms... stuck with mountains of
unsaleable paper.1
93
ADVISORY COMM'N, AUCTION RATE SECURITIES1 (2004) (noting that ARS "are priced and traded as
short term instruments because of the liquidity provided through the interest rate reset mechanism.").
188. Prior to an auction, brokers will typically engage in "price talk" with clients, designed to elicit
the range of likely clearing rates. The talk will normally concern general macroeconomic events, the
issuer's credit rating, the clearing rate in the last auction and the reset period of the ARS.
189. Obviously, no securities are allocated to bidders who specified a minimum rate above the so-
called clearing rate.
190. See, e.g. Jacqueline Doherty, The Sad Story of Auction-Rate Securities, BARRON'S, May 26,
2008, at 32.
191. See Morgenson, supra note 185 (observing that ARS have historically bested money market
funds by one percentage point). See also Sarah Lacy, When Will Auction Rate Securities Blow Up the
Valley?, Bus. INSIDER, Mar. 31, 2008, http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/3/when-will-auction-rate-
securities-blow-up-the-valley- (referring to auction rate securities as "cash on steroids").
192. See Doherty, supra note 190, at 32 (referring to ARS as being "once considered a money
market alternative."). See also D'Silva, et al., supra note 177, at 3. See also LEE, supra note 179, at 1
(noting that ARS were often marketed to investors as an alternative to money market funds, leading
many to consider them cash-like).
193. Henry Blodget, Monster, Earthlink, Palm Blow it Again, Buy Millions in Auction-Rate
Securities, Bus. INSIDER, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/3/monster-earthlink-
palm-blow-it-again-buy-millions-in-auction-rate-securities. Some may recognize Mr. Blodget from his
more colorful days as an analyst at Merrill Lynch, until the research scandal consumed the industry in
2002.
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A failed auction can occur due to a lack of demand which, in turn,
leads to no receipt of a clearing bid. Following a failed auction, then-
existing holders of ARS will hold their positions at the maximum or
"penalty" rate provided in the security's offering document until sufficient
bids are entered to establish a clearing bid at the next auction.194 Following
the February 2008 failures, ARS holders were left holding indefinitely
securities that they only intended to hold for the shortest of maturities-a
great price to pay for a small return above that offered by the money
market.
Summing up the failed experiment in the design and implementation
of the auction rate security market, the experts at the Federal Reserve
(eventually) got it quite right and offered a warning of liquidity risks with
broader application:
Auction rate securities represented an ingenious attempt to square a
particular financial circle: to create a funding instrument that appears
long term from the borrower's perspective but short term from the
lender's perspective. We now see what should have been obvious
before: Such an arrangement is impossible. If a funding instrument is
long term for one party, it also must be long term for the counterparty;
any appearance to the contrary must be an illusion. The collapse of the
ARS market is but one example of how the recent liquidity crisis in our
financial markets has adversely affected all arrangements that funded
long-term investments with short-duration liabilities. Because such
arrangements are inherently unstable, their failure can cause great
discomfort for borrowers or lenders or both. 195
The shame of the liquidity episode that beset the auction rate
securities market is that it took a failed market and all of the related costs
before market participants and regulators learned what the Federal Reserve
now admits "should have been obvious."'
96
A burned auction rate securities investor who seems to have gotten
religion, albeit a little too late, delivers our lesson once again:
[s]o the credit crisis has struck again, this time in what I thought was
the safest comer of my portfolio. Is any fixed-income security short of
U.S. Treasurys and the biggest, most liquid money-market fund safe at
this point? I'd like to think so, but this experience has left me shaken.
I don't want to contribute to the irrational panic that seems to have
swept the debt markets. But if you own any securities that depend on
194. While not required to, underwriters may provide a clearing bid to ensure the success of an
auction and provide liquidity to investors wishing to sell.
195. D'Silva, et al., supra note 177, at 3.
196. Id.
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investor confidence or raise any liquidity issues, beware of the risks.'97
If the recent credit crisis has had the effect of calling the building
block at the epicenter of modem finance into question, it certainly follows
that investors in every asset class emanating out on the risk continuum-
from the so-called risk-free to the riskiest asset-would be wise to
reevaluate the risk of their individual investments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the lessons of the LTCM failure and the intense focus on
liquidity risk and correlation breakdown that followed, many financial
institutions repeated the same mistakes in the current credit crisis. Bear
Steams was one of many firms that relied on the linear groupthink that has
come to dominate the financial markets. In fact, as the auction rate
securities market highlights, products and entire markets were designed in
recent years without any healthy respect for the potential for a liquidity
episode and an understanding that the one ounce straw that ultimately
breaks the camel's back has more than a linear effect. Without the LTCM
experience, these failures might have qualified as failures of imagination.
With LTCM as a backdrop, however, these failures are inexcusable and can
only be characterized as failures of rigor. Armed with the roadmap for how
liquidity risk and correlation breakdown could turn pernicious and the
ability to understand, model and insulate against the effects of these risks,
these financial institutions chose to march further into the darkness without
so much as a flashlight. Actors in the market had ample opportunity to cry
out like the young boy in Anderson's story-that the emperor had no
clothes! Time and again they passed on that opportunity-decisions that
each institution will likely regret for a long time.
Participants and their advisors in today's markets have a taller order
than ever. Aside from the necessity of a substantial base knowledge in the
principles of finance, successful participants must possess a rigor,
discipline and humility to manage complex risks in an ever-shifting
regulatory environment. The most successful players will remain ever
vigilant, with a maturity to probe issues beyond the surface. A healthy
skepticism of the accepted theories that underpin markets and products and
the humility to understand and question the limitations of the tools
employed to measure risks will aid in navigating the complex set of risks in
today's markets. Let there be no doubt, however, that a client will be well
served by an attorney that has taken the lesson of this Article to heart.
197. Stewart, supra note 180.
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